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Articles
William F. Foster* and Constitutional Protection of
Gayle Pinheiro** the Right to an Education
I. Introduction
The education of its citizenry is often recognized as one of the most
important public services provided by the state. The history of the rise
and development of public education in the provinces of Canada reveals,
above all, the influence of the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches.'
The educational philosophy, aims and broader objectives of the public
education system reflected the moral and religious doctrines of the faith
which had sponsored the founding of the institution.2 Yet there also
existed a pervasive belief among the general populace in the power of
education to support and nourish basic democratic values. Moreover, any
judicial or legislative involvement with educational issues tended to
centre on the constitutional protection for separate schools and the rights
of linguistic minorities to educational services in their mother tongue.3
A new issue now threatens to compete for attention with these
traditional values. Downward trends in educational achievement by
students in at least the public sector of the educational system 4 have
raised widespread and serious concerns over the quality of the education
provided. Furthermore, government restraint (if not parsimony) in the
funding of education has created serious doubts as to the ability of the
system to accommodate the wide range of demands made of it while
improving the literacy levels of those who pass through it. These factors,
coupled with popular movements for greater accountability in education,
raise, it is suggested, a fundamental question for the legal system - what
*Professor of Law, McGill University
**LL.B., B.C.L. (McGill)
We would like to express our gratitude to Professors S. Birks, P. Glenn, D. Jutras and
R. Macdonald for their helpful comments and suggestions on this paper. We would also like
to acknowledge with thanks the financial assistance of the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada.
1. See generally Sissons, Church and State in Canadian Education (1959).
2. See generally Wallace, A History of the University of Toronto (1927); Sissons, A History of
the University of Victoria (1952).
3. See eg., Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards v. A.G. Quebec, [1984] 2 S.C.R.
66. See also Bale, "Law, Politics and the Manitoba School Question: Supreme Court and Privy
Council" (1985), 63 Can. B. Rev. 461.
4. Nikifourk, "Why Our Teachers Can't Teach", Quest Magazine, September 1984, at 35.
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role, if any, should legal mechanisms play in the struggle to ensure that
each child receives a high quality education?
The importance of education to society as a whole, over and above the
personal and financial advantages that accrue to the educated individual,
has produced a broad spectrum of scholarship on the function of the
educational system within society 5 By comparison, legal scholarship in
education has been restricted largely to questions of equal access and
equal opportunity - both concepts interpreted as establishing a
prohibition against discrimination based on race and, more recently, on
mental and physical disability in the provision of educational services.
But legal mechanisms protecting equal access to educational services are
meaningless without further controls over the quality of educational
services provided. The value of educational services to the individual can
only be measured by the quality of instruction received.6 Yet the decision
of the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education7 stands as the
lone judicial pronouncement that equality of educational opportunity
must include an evaluation of the quality of educational services
provided.
However, a consensus seems to be emerging that a crisis now exists in
the public school system, because of its failure to impart basic knowledge
to individuals. Present illiteracy trends demonstrate that traditional
political mechanisms, local control and legislative reform, have failed to
ensure every individual a standard of educational achievement
appropriate to becoming a fully functioning member of society. If it is
accepted that an individual's interest in educational services is a
"fundamental" right that extends beyond questions of access to include
the quality of services received, legal mechanisms designed to protect
educational interests must address policies having an adverse effect on the
quality of services provided; and the general reluctance to employ legal
mechanisms to devise a standard to regulate the quality of instruction
provided in the public school system must be re-evaluated.
5. Throughout the modem era, education has been hailed as a cornerstone of democracy and
economic advancement. It is seen as the primary cultural vehicle through which a society
rejuvenates its values and aspirations: Butts & Cremin, A History of Education in American
Culture (1955); Katz & Mattingly, ed's, Education and Social Change: Themes from Ontario's
Past (1975); and Dewey, Democracy and Education (1957).
6. "... mhe poor man, whom the law does not allow to take an ear of corn when starving,
nor a pair of shoes for his freezing feet, is allowed to put his hand in the pocket of the rich and
say, you shall educate me, not as you will, but as I will: not alone in the elements, but, by
further provision, in the languages, in sciences, in the useful and in elegant arts". Ralph Waldo
Emerson, "Education", in Rippa, ed., Educational Ideas in America: A Documentary History
176 (1969).
7. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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It is, of course, arguable that legal structures of "rights" and "duties"
may be inappropriate mechanisms for most dispute resolution and
adjudication within the educational system.
From a legalistic standpoint, amassing evidence, finding witnesses, and
being mentally prepared to do legal battle may be a legitimate way to
conduct one's affairs. However, the workings of the education system are
not and should not be analogous to those of the courtroom. A co-operative
attitude is of little importance in judicial cases, but it is crucial in
education ... [otherwise] education will be radically transformed into a
(sic) disputatious arena in which enormous energy is wasted in attempting
to demonstrate the primacy of one set of "facts" over another.8
Nevertheless, a closer inquiry into the administrative structure and
objectives of the educational system is required before the dispute
resolution structure of legally enforceable "rights" can be dismissed.
Even if it is accepted that the primary purpose of the educational
system is to confer benefits on students and that the interests of students
and educators are generally compatible, the vital importance of education
requires that students must possess some legally recognizable interest in
the process, allowing them to challenge educational procedures, decisions
or policies adopted by school boards or administrators.9 And when the
interests of students and educators do conflict, the resolution of such
conflicts should not be left to the traditional model of a benevolent
dictatorship of professional educators.
Yet courts, often upholding the powers and expertise of local
educational authorities, have proven reluctant to intervene in student-
teacher or student-school board disputes, thereby leaving a student with
no independent adjudicative body in which to protect his interest in
receiving an effective education. School authorities, for example, have a
legitimate interest in promulgating rules and regulations designed to
ensure order and discipline within public schools. However, the interest
of central educational authorities in maintaining order and discipline
should not be held to override the student's interest in an effective
education, fair procedures in evaluation, promotion and dismissal, equal
educational opportunity, and the opportunity to argue that such interests
have been severely curtailed or even denied by the actions of educational
8. Hodder, "The Education Act (Ontario) 1980" (1984), 15:3 Interchange 44 at 46.
9. The educational process is often regarded as asymetrical - the teacher instructs and the
student is expected to execute the required task. Furthermore, the discretion granted educators
in regulating a student's academic and extra-curricular activities is broad. See Hollander, Legal
Handbook for Educators 85-116 (1978), for a discussion of the professional discretion of
educators in an American setting, and Mackay, Education Law in Canada (1982) for a similar
discussion in the Canadian setting.
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authorities. A greater balance is required in the dispute resolution process
available within the educational setting.
That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important
principles of our government as mere platitudes.10
Both the structure of the educational system, which localizes power in the
hands of educational authorities, and the spirit of its objective to inculcate
rational thought, require a system of dispute resolution ensuring the
student independent and impartial adjudication. For this reason, the
concept of "right to an education" is at least plausible as a way of
conceiving the question here in issue.
II. Framework of the Inquiry
Education is a vast and complex field. It is also a lifelong activity carried
out by a number of social groups - the family, civic, religious and
volunteer organizations, governmental agencies, business, the media and
the like - in addition to the formal school system. However, the
following discussion of the proper classification of an individual's interest
in educational services deals primarily with the public education sector
- that sector to which the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
might apply since it is a matter "within the authority of the legislature of
each province".,
A thorough examination of the question of whether there exists a right
to an education and, if so, the proper scope of such a right, is fundamental
in establishing the role of the courts in reviewing educational policies in
general. This right may be based on constitutional principles of
fundamental justice and equal protection, or upon statutory enactments
or the duties of parents under the common law. However, this paper only
addresses the question whether the right may be constitutionally based. 12
The structure of analysis to be followed may be stated briefly. First,
regard will be had to a variety of arguments maintaining that education
deserves constitutional protection by virtue of its central role in the
development of the individual and the betterment of society at large.
Next, the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States in San
10. West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) at 637.
11. Section 32(1), Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act 1982 being
Schedule B of the Canada Act 1983 (U.K.), c. 11 (hereinafter cited as the Charter).
12. For a discussion of the right to an education and the need for its constitutional protection
in a Canadian context, see MacKay, "Public Education in Nova Scotia: Legal Rights, Fleeting
Privileges or Political Rhetoric?" (1984), 8 Dalhousie L.J. 137.
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Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,3 which held that
education was not constitutionally protected, will be examined. This
decision, rather than being considered as definitively denying a
constitutional right to an education, can be used, it is suggested, to
construct a constitutional right to an education under the due process and
equal protection provisions of the American constitution and the
fundamental justice and equal protection and equal benefit provisions of
the Canadian constitution.
It is to the applicability of the foregoing principles to the educational
arena that the balance of this paper is addressed. While the terminology
used in the Canadian constitution differs from that found in the American
constitution, arguably similar concepts exist therein. Indeed, fundamental
justice in the Canadian Charter recently has been interpreted as ensuring
substantive as well as procedural protection; that is, along the broad
models of due process theory elaborated in the United States. Again, in
speaking of equal protection and equal benefit of the law, and given the
character, purpose, and larger objectives of the Charter, parallels seem to
exist with American principles of equal protection and opportunity.
Consequently, the analysis of the fundamental justice and equal
protection and benefit arguments will be comparative, beginning with an
examination of relevant American jurisprudence (which is considerably
more extensive in these areas). Regard will then be had to Canadian
materials to determine where parallel principles or constructions may be
attempted.
The critical task in evaluating the aforementioned principles as legal
mechanisms to protect an individual's interest in an education is to
explore their impact on judicial approaches to the review of political and
administrative decision-making. An optimal protective framework
constructed on the basis of these principles will help to legitimate
increased judicial intervention in areas of educational policy most likely
to give rise to litigation and will permit greater protection of the
individual's interest in an education without embroiling the courts in
educational policy issues.
Two opposing models of the substantive limits of a right to an
education are utilized in this paper. The first model focuses on the
individual student and argues that persons have a right to be educated "to
the limits of their capacities". This model was adopted by the state of
Illinois in 1970.14 The second model focuses on educational output and
13. San Antonio Independent SchoolDistrict v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
14. Art. X, s. 1 of the illinois Constitution.
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argues that the right to an education encompasses the right to achieve a
minimum level of proficiency in basic literacy skills.15
The harm, or legally recognizable injury, to be redressed through the
recognition of a constitutionally protected "right to an education" must
also be elaborated. Basically, inequality of educational opportunity -
defined broadly in terms of both access to educational facilities and of the
quality of educational services offered - represents discrimination in the
provision of government services. Given general societal prohibitions
against discrimination, and the recognized importance of the individual's
interest in receiving high quality educational services, 16 the issue becomes
how judicial review of educational decisions may best be structured
rather than whether judicial review of educational decisions is warranted.
Recognition of a right to an education would extend legal principles to
areas heretofore unregulated through formal adjudicative mechanisms.
The process undertaken in this paper is an attempt to construct a model
of constitutional interpretation that permits the judiciary to distinguish
legitimate from illegitimate policy considerations in areas where the
individual interest affected is fundamental.
III. Education: A Fundamental Right?
It must be noted that a right to an education is not among the rights
explicitly guaranteed either by the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms or the American Constitution. Moreover, the nature of a right
to an education differs substantially from the more traditional civil and
political rights, such as freedom of speech or assembly, which do not
require that government confer a benefit.
Fundamental rights are often perceived as limitations on government
action. Under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, legislation that
impinges upon an individual's protected rights is invalid unless passed
under the override clause in section 33, or demonstrably a reasonable
limit prescribed by law and justified in a free and democratic society.17 In
the United States, a standard of strict judicial scrutiny, which denies the
legislative scheme the benefit of the usual presumption of validity, is
applied to such legislation. This standard, which compels the state to
demonstrate "compelling state interests" before the legislative scheme
15. "The constitutional value of education, like that of voting, depends upon rigorous equality.
Inequalities in education produce "unequal job opportunities, disparate income, and
handicapped ability to participate in the social, cultural and political activity of our society".
Ratner, "A New Legal Duty for Urban Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills" (1985),
63 Texas L. Rev. 776.
16. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971) at 1257, citing San Francisco Unified School
Dis v. Johnson; 479 P. 2d 669 (1971) at 676.
17. S. I, Charter.
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will be upheld, is reserved, however, for cases involving "laws that
operate to the disadvantage of suspect classes or interfere with the
exercise of fundamental rights and liberties explicitly or implicitly
protected by the constitution". 18 If it could be established successfully that
an individual's interest in an education was a fundamental right, the
courts might become less secure in habitually deferring, in their review of
the formation and implementation of educational policies, to the
expertise of pedagogical authorities, or the vagaries of the political
process.
Furthermore, the existence of a fundamental right to an education may
have a significant effect on the standard of care imposed both on
educators in the performance of their duties and on legislators in
allocating resources to the educational system. Generally speaking,
United States courts have refused to uphold legislative schemes allotting
insufficient funds and thus failing to ensure that the rights of all recipients
are respected. The courts have utilized the prohibitions against
discrimination and arbitrary classification to require governmental
authorities to ensure the provision of adequate services. Consequently, in
such areas as the provision of special services for physically or mentally
handicapped youngsters, the existence of a fundamental right could
counter government arguments that it is providing the maximum amount
of services possible within its budget.
Thus, even if it is accepted that students have a right to an education,
it still is necessary to inquire whether this right should be accorded
constitutional protection by virtue of its fundamental role in society.19
There are several arguments which can be made in favour of affording
the right to an education such protection.
1. Education: An Egalitarian Liberty
Egalitarian liberties, claims to equality of opportunity in access to
educational or employment situations, have been the liberties most
neglected by the judiciary in constitutional interpretation in Canada.20
Because equality is fundamental to the proper exercise of political
18. For a general, introductory discussion of standards ofjudicial review in fundamental rights
litigation, see Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaiv (1978).
19. There may also be an argument that the right to an education is explicitly protected by
s. 93 of the BNA Act 1867, 30-31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.) (now called the Constitution Act, 1867)
which protects denominational schools. Section 93 of the BNA Act has been narrowly
interpreted as protecting primarily those rights and privileges which relate to denominational
schools: Ottawa Separate School Trustees v. Mackell [1917] A.C. 62 (P.C.) at 71-74. An in-
depth analysis of the scope of protection afforded under s. 93 is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, on this subject, see Bale, supra, note 3.
20. Laskin, "Civil Liberties" (1959), 37 Can. Bar Rev. 77 at 80-82.
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liberties, such as free speech, and serves to protect the dignity of the
individual, egalitarian liberties should be provided with constitutional
protections: "And - at least where education is concerned - the
protection afforded by the equal protection guarantee does not stop at the
poverty line. It also addresses inequalities within the category of 'non-
needy' families.
'21
However, it is possible to argue that an individual has a vital interest
in a number of services - the provisions of adequate housing and
sufficient food, for example - and that it would be unwise to extend
constitutional protection to such a wide variety of interests. Thus, many
argue that a distinction must be drawn between rights dependent on the
restriction of government activity - traditional fundamental liberties or
rights - and those dependent on social consensus and the formulation of
government policies. Government programs like welfare or public
education, by their very nature, require entitlement criteria, resource
distribution hierarchies and political control mechanisms, such as locally-
elected school boards. The constitutionalization of government benefit
schemes could supposedly hinder government efforts to administer such
schemes by allowing ineligible recipients to contest the deprivation of
their benefits by legal means.
22
Be that as it may, the theoretical distinction between rights that depend
on restricting government action and rights that require positive action on
the part of government can be characterized as a false dichotomy where
the issue to be determined is the degree of deference afforded by the
judiciary in reviewing government policy decisions. Many of the benefits
available under modern welfare legislation incorporate passive elements
(which merely restrict government action) and active elements (which
call on the government to confer positive benefits) within the same
legislative scheme. It would be illogical to restrict access to judicial
review to those elements of such a scheme characterized as passive. Once
a substantive individual right has been threatened, the judiciary must
consider the legislative scheme in its entirety to avoid violating the
purpose of the enactment. It is difficult then to maintain a rights/privilege
distinction when applying the kinds of standard used by the modem
law.23
21. Hartzellv. Connell 201 Cal. Rpt. 601 (1984) at 618.
22. "The operation of a welfare state is a new experiment for our Nation. For this reason...
I feel that new experiments in carrying out a welfare program should not be frozen into our
constitutional structure. They shall be left, as are other legislative determinations, to the...
legislatures that people elect to make our laws." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969) at
277-78 (Justice Black dissenting).
23. "Especially today, a person may have discretionary rights, that is to say, his right to do
something depends on establishing that this falls under some general and often vague standard
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Where the right is dependent on positive government action, it is no
less deserving of judicial protection. Furthermore, the protection of
welfare rights need not entail the extension of judicial discretion beyond
traditional legal conceptions of an impartial, non-politicized judiciary.
The framework required would allow the judiciary to determine the
validity of policy considerations employed in providing welfare benefits
without requiring that they create, implement and administer the schemes
in question. The classification of interests not expressly provided
constitutional protection is perhaps a political process as well as an
exercise in legal reasoning.
24
2. Education A Utilitarian Perspective
Further, a fundamental right to an education may also be based on
arguments of social utility. The pivotal role played by educational
services in contemporary society has been acknowledged.25 A proper
education is a prerequisite to reasoned exercise of political and economic
liberties. Justification for the existence of a right to an education can be
found in international human rights documents, classic political
pronouncements, and philosophical theories of justice.
Thus, for example, the existence of a fundamental right to an education
is recognized in three separate international human rights instruments to
which Canada is a signatory: the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,26 the Declaration of the Rights of the Child,27 and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Culltural Rights.28 The
spirit of the international enactments concerning the right to an education
is that a well-educated global population will help to achieve world
peace. Both Article 26 of the Universal Declaration and Article 13 of the
International Covenant denote the goals of education to be the full
such as what is 'reasonable', 'fair', or 'in the public interest' .... The relationship between
judicial decisions based on such 'open-ended' criteria and the decisions of other branches of
government is best seen by considering standards which, prima facie, are very similar to the
kinds of consideration which the latter commonly invoke". Bell, Policy Arguments in Judicial
Decisions 38 (1983).
24. See, in this regard, the dissenting judgement of Marshall J. in San Antonio Independent
SchoolDistrict v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) at 110-16.
25. See, eg., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) at 493, where the court
observed, "Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
government". See also Dewey, supra, note 5.
26. U.N. Doc. A/811, 1948, Art. 26.
27. U.N. G/A Res. 1386 (XIV), Nov. 20, 1959, Principle 7.
28. UN G/A Res. 2200A (XXI), 16 Dec. 1966 (entered into force on January 3, 1976), Art.
13. The right to an education is also protected under the Human Rights Codes of a number
of provinces. See, eg., Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, R.S.S. 1978, c. S-9, s. 13(1);
Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, 2R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-12, art. 40.
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development of the human personality and the promotion of
"understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or
religious groups [to] further the activities of the United Nations for the
maintenance of peace". Principle 7 of the Declaration of the Rights of the
Child requires that a child be given an education "to develop his abilities,
his individual judgement, . . . and to become a useful member of society".
Indeed, public education is the primary modem means through which
a society transmits its culture to the young. The power of the educational
system in this regard cannot be seriously questioned.29 Judicial
pronouncements creating or establishing rights for students within the
education system have cited the role of the educational system in training
future citizens as the justification for legal intervention.3 0 Schools seek to
impart respect for democratic principles and institutions through a variety
of techniques and procedures. Perhaps the best indication of the effect of
schooling on the exercise of political rights is the direct correlation
between the level of schooling obtained and the exercise of the franchise.
In fact, many critics of the educational system argue that the system has
become a microcosm of adult concerns rather than an environment
which fosters learning for pleasure."
However, arguments that an education helps to ensure the quality of
constitutional rights possessed by individuals may be somewhat more
problematic to construct. Even assuming that equal educational
opportunity can be achieved in the substantive sense of equal access,
equal resources and the like, disadvantaged children nevertheless may
continue to attain lower levels of academic achievement and remain
impervious to the quality of their basic rights.32 Social factors other than
education undoubtedly also affect how involved an individual will
become in the democratic process.33 Providing the individual with an
29. See generally, Wishy, The Child and the Republic (1968) for a discussion of the historical
evolution of public education as a socializing agent.
30. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has observed, "It can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
Schoolhouse gate". Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Distric4 393 U.S.
503 (1969) at 506.
31. Holt, How Children Fail (1965). But see, contra, Frankena, "The Concept of Education
Today", in Doyle, ed., Educational Judgements 19 (1973).
32. Illich, Deschooling Society 6 (1971), has stated that: "It should be obvious that even with
schools of equal quality a poor child can seldom catch up with a rich one... poor children
lack most of the educational opportunities which are casually available to the middle class
child... So the poorer student will generally fall behind so long as he depends on school for
advancement or learning."
33. The relationship between educational achievement and exercise of the franchise,
nonetheless, is established. See United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1968, Current Population Reports, Series
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education, it could be argued, only attacks a symptom of a more
pervasive social inequality.
Although there is no guarantee that an individual who receives an
education will be more diligent in the exercise of his basic rights,
sociological data demonstrate that educated individuals are more likely to
become active on the community level.34 Thus, while education alone
cannot overcome the effects of a disadvantaged economic position, it
may afford the individual increased choice. Once possessed of the skills
required to exercise basic rights of speech, assembly, or the franchise, the
individual may choose the circumstances under which he will become
involved rather than being permanently excluded because of a lack of
such skills. The importance of ensuring that the individual is able to
choose to become involved in the exercise of basic rights - and will
possess the skills to participate effectively - then becomes readily
apparent.35 Thus, it is argued that a lack of education is an objective
shackle to effective participation.
3 6
Constitutional protection of political liberties does not, of course,
guarantee the individual "the most effective" speech or "the most
informed electoral choice". 37 Nevertheless, enshrining a right within the
constitution gives it a special and peculiar status 8 As a minimum, it
should be accepted that this status requires that the individual will have
the opportunity to acquire "effective speech" or "informed electoral
choice". If constitutional rights cannot be overtly infringed or withdrawn
by government action, they should not be rendered void and superfluous
by denying individuals the opportunity to acquire an effective
education.39
P-20, No. 192, p.17, Table 4. In Canada, see generally, Mischler, Political Participation in
Canada (1979) and Butler & Stokes, Political Change in Canada (1979).
34. Mischler, id; J. Coleman et at., Equality ojEducational Opportunity (1966).
35. As Rand J. has noted: ". .. Canadian Government is in substance the will of the majority
expressed directly or indirectly through popular assemblies .... Parliamentary government
postulates a capacity in men, acting freely and under self-restraints, to govern themselves; and
that advance is best served in the degree achieved of individual liberation from subjective as
well as objective shackles". Switzman v. Ebling [1957] S.C.R. 285 at 358.
36. See authorities cited supra, notes 33 and 34.
37. See: San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
38. Subject, of course, in Canada, to the reasonable limits clause in s. 1 of the Charter, which
states that the rights and freedoms therein guaranteed are subject: ".. . only to such reasonable
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society"; and
the statutory override provision in s. 33 of the Charter.
39. As has been stated, "education also supports each and every other value of a democratic
society - participation, communication and social mobility, to name but a few". Serrano v.
ries4 487 P. 2d 1241 (Cal. Sup. Ct., 1971) at 1258, citing Coons, Clune, & Sugarman,
"Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures"
(1969), 57 Cal. L. Rev. 300 at 362-63.
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However, the instrumentality of an education goes well beyond basic
considerations such as speech and electoral choice.40 Education, in fact,
touches the exercise of all four categories of individual liberties: political
liberties, economic liberties, legal liberties, and egalitarian liberties.
Therefore, the close relationship between education and lifestyle and
between education and political activity may justify arguments that
education should be raised to the status of a constitutional right on the
basis of utilitarian considerations - in short, the proper exercise of the
majority of constitutional rights requires that the individual possess an
education.
3. Other Considerations
In addition, it must be acknowledged that, with the evolution of a state-
supported system of public education, the government has acquired a
virtual monopoly on the dissemination of information to children of
compulsory schooling age. Across Canada, provincial governments have
assumed the responsibility of regulating the educational curriculum,
methods of instruction, and teacher certification. The public educational
system is currently the only formal structure established to impart basic
skills and knowledge to a broad cross-section of citizens. In short, there
is no present viable alternative to government-sponsored formal
educational structures. Furthermore, the traditional aim of modem
educational institutions, to provide fair equality of opportunity to all,
41
becomes increasingly significant to the maintenance of democratic
40. In Serrano v. Priest 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971) at 1258-59 the California Supreme Court
held that education should be classified as a "fundamental interest" because of its "distinctive
and priceless function" in society. The Court isolated five aspects of the educational system
which distinguished it from other government services:
First, education is essential in maintaining ... "free enterprise deomocracy" - that is,
preserving an individual's opportunity to compete successfully in the economic
marketplace, despite a disadvantaged background ....
Second, education is universally relevant .... Every person benefits from an
education....
Third, public education continues over a lengthy period of life - between 10 and 13 years.
Few other government services have such sustained.., contact with the recipient. ...
Fourth, education is unmatched in the extent to which it molds the personality of the youth
of society ... public education attempts to shape a child's personal development in a
manner chosen... by the state....
Finally, education is so important that the state has made it compulsory....
41. Education has traditionally been viewed in Canada as an equalizing force in society. See
Sissons, supra, note 1, at 19. The view of education as an equalizing force developed somewhat
later in the United States. See Butts & Cremin, supra, note 5, and Erikson, Childhood and
Society (1964).
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structures as a society matures.42 "Only against the background of a just
basic structure, including a just political constitution and a just
arrangement of economic and social institutions, can one say that the
requisite just procedure exists. '43 The nature of the educational
undertaking, the dependence of the participants on the services received
and the importance of educational achievement in the broader social
context creates substantial justification for allowing legal redress even
though such redress is directed to the remediation of a non-traditional
harm - inequality of educational opportunity and achievement -
which is ongoing and may be the result of a number of causal factors.
The role of the educational system has been justified in a number of
different ways. Perhaps the most popular argument is that an education
is essential for an individual to become a fully functioning member of
society.44 As Epictetus observed: "Only the educated are free".45 Others
have urged that a well-educated population is a prerequisite to
maintaining democratic structures and ideals. 46 It can also be argued that
an effective education - one that imparts knowledge of basic skills and
trains the individual to logical thought and analysis - forms the basis of
individual dignity and self-respect:
To be reduced to life-long dependance on the support of others, however
- even supposing this to be forthcoming - might itself be regarded as an
unacceptable humiliation and therefore as a harm from which the
individual is entitled to be protected.47
The role played by the educational system in the personal development
of the individual may serve as a more functional justification for
arguments that the right to an education is deserving of constitutional
protection. Each individual should be entitled to achieve a normative
standard of literacy as a basic minimum. While individuals enter the
educational system possessed of widely variant academic talents and
levels of motivation (inequalities which the system, in effect, is powerless
to alter) it is crucial that a distinction be drawn between the product of
42. Litigation that has arisen over perceived inequality of educational opportunity has become
increasingly sophisticated in its demands for judicial involvement in the allocation of
educational resources. From the essentially non-interventionist stance in Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896) - the so-called "separate but equal doctrine" - courts are now prepared
to strike down regional desegregation plans if they fail to provide special arrangements for
students engaged in extra-curricular activities. See Kelly v. Metropolitan City Bd of Ed, 492
F Supp. 167 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
43. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 87 (1973).
44. See. Brown v. Board of Education, 347, U.S. 483 (1954).
45. Discourses, Book II, Chap. 1.
46. The most convincing treatment of the role of educational institutions in democracy is
fictional. See Clavell, The Children's Story (1963).
47. Wringe, Children's Rights 146(1981).
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an education - the substantive knowledge imparted - and its processes.
Many children fail to develop the basic thought processes that would
allow them to face daily problems with confidence.48 And poorly
developed thought processes then become a type of cognitive albatross
that may inhibit both further effective learning and personal
development.49 In a society that prizes learning and achievement, there
can be no dignity for the individual deprived of an opportunity to
develop basic structures of effective thought. Yet the individual's right to
dignity is a clearly accepted tenet of both constitutional law and
international human rights agreements.
Consequently, education should be accorded a preferred status because
it is intimately tied to the development of individual dignity and
administered by a monopolistic structure which, in many ways, denies
the individual any opportunity or choice of alternative educational
opportunities.50 If constitutional guarantees restraining government and
majoritarian discrimination are to remain fundamental constructs of
social ordering, the scope of their protection must expand to non-
traditional interests, such as an education, which have come to assume a
dominant influence on individual development.
IV. Constitutional Protection of the Right to Education: An American
View
It is arguable that the Canadian courts, as their American counterparts,
will be reluctant to accept interests not expressly listed in the Constitution
as deserving of constitutional protection. Nevertheless, the foregoing
arguments that the right to an education should be so accepted on the
basis that it is inherent to the dignity of the individual, or that it is a
prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of a broad variety of constitutional
rights should be sufficient to overcome judicial reluctance to expand the
interests subject to constitutional protection.51 However, that has not
been the case yet in America.
48. Holt, supra, note 31, at 56-57.
49. Holt, How Children Learn 7-3 (1970).
50. See, eg., Coons & Sugarman, Education By Choice (1978) for a discussion of educational
voucher plans which would give students and their parents greater choice in the type of
educational experience they received.
51. The majority of the U.S. Supreme court, after considering the arguments raised in Serrano
(that education should be recognized as a fundamental interest) stated that it found such
arguments "unpersuasive": San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973) at 37. Lower courts faced with school finance litigation after Rodriguez have not all
followed the Supreme Court's reasoning. See, eg., Hartzell v. Connel 201 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1984); Frederick L v. Thomas, 419 F Supp. 960 (E.D. Pa 1976), affd 557 F 2d 373 (3d
Circ. 1977).
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The most comprehensive judicial pronouncement rendered to date by
the United States Supreme Court on the question of whether there exists
a right to an education is found in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez.52 In a five-to-four judgement, the Court upheld a
Texas school financing scheme which resulted in radically disproportion-
ate per pupil expenditures on an interdistrict comparison. The financing
scheme required the greatest proportion of each school district's funds to
be raised through property taxes levied on property within the district. In
attacking the validity of the scheme, the appellees had argued that
education was a "fundamental" interest; substantial interdistrict disparity
in per pupil expenditure reflected the quality of educational opportunity
provided to the children in each district; the effect of the scheme denied
poorer children the chance to receive an education of similar quality to
that offered in wealthier districts and thus violated equal protection
principles.
The majority of the Supreme Court rejected the findings of the U.S.
District Court that education was a fundamental interest. After citing its
opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, characterizing education as "a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values,
... preparing him for later professional training, and ... helping him to
adjust normally to his environment", 53 Mr. Justice Powell, for the
majority, stated simply: "the importance of a service performed by the
state does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for
purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause."
54
In other words, the Court was of the view that it could not assume
jurisdiction to characterize interests as fundamental, and therefore subject
to constitutional protection, but rather, that the proper role for the Court
in constitutional litigation simply was to recognize established
constitutional rights and afford them the level of protection the
Constitution demanded.
Despite the formalistic overtones of the reasoning employed by the
majority, the Rodriguez judgement should not be considered
determinative of the proper classification of a right to an education. The
majority accepted both the proposition that a right not explicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution may be implicitly guaranteed, and the fact
that some "identifiable quantum of education" may be a constitutionally
protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of other basic rights.
55
52. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
53. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) at 493.
54. San Antonio Independent SchoolDistrict v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) at 30.
55. Id, at 36-37.
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The appellee's unsuccessful argument in Rodriguez was that disparate
funding led to relative differences in the quality of education available to
children in poorer districts. Therefore, in view of the majority judgment,
a litigant seeking to establish education as a fundamental interest would
have two options: he could accept the Rodriguez reasoning and attempt
to demonstrate that the authorities involved failed to provide him with an
"identifiable minimum quantum of education"; or he could challenge the
validity of the arguments in the majority opinion.
The concept of a constitutionally-protected minimum quantum of
education corresponds to the educational output model. From a judicial
standpoint, the issue would then become how to determine what type of
education could be designated as "minimum." Justice Powell hints at two
standards: total denial of educational opportunity, or the provision of
"each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills
necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full
participation in the political process. '56 To employ the standard requiring
total denial of educational opportunity is excessive. The majority
accepted earlier court pronouncements on the weight of an individual's
interest in an education, and pointed out that the plaintiff introduced no
evidence to refute the State's assertion that a minimum education was
provided to every child. To require complete denial of educational
opportunity would be anomalous because of the accepted weight of the
interest involved and, by analogy, the standard of review employed in
other types of welfare rights litigation.57
On the other hand, to adopt a constitutional standard which required
that every child be given an opportunity to acquire basic skills necessary
to exercise rights of speech and political rights would quickly plunge the
courts into the position of having to review educational policy. By
explicitly recognizing the close linkage between education and the
exercise of other constitutional rights, the majority accepted utilitarian
justifications for extending constitutional protection to education.
Relative disparities in funding did not violate the right to an education.
Such disparities did not bar the individual from receiving an education
which would allow him "full participation" in the political process: "As
long as the state did not define its educational objective the Court in
56. Id, at 38-39.
57. See, eg., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969) (AFDC payments are a proprietary
interest deserving of due process protection and, therefore, cannot be terminated without prior
notice and hearing); and Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (failure to provide English
lessons to students of Chinese ancestry violated equal protection under #601 of the Civil Rights
Act 1964,42 U.S.C. #2000 d.).
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Rodriguez allowed the state wide latitude in providing the means, no
matter how disproportional to that vague end...-58
If the objective of the educational system is defined in utilitarian terms
- effective use of rights of speech and political rights - and it can be
demonstrated by accepted methods of evaluation that such objectives are
not being attained, the amount of latitude afforded to the state would
have to be reduced. Educational authorities could be asked to
demonstrate that their methods of student classification were a valid
means to attain the constitutional objective, that such students had been
given appropriate instruction, and that their structure of program and
instructional material had a basis in fact.5 9
There remains, therefore, sufficient room to maneuvre within the
majority decision in Rodriguez to construct a substantive right to an
education. The conception of a minimum-protected quantum of
education must be continually re-evaluated. Even if only a substantive
minimum education is constitutionally protected, nevertheless the
minimum standard provided must remain relevant to the constitutional
objective of full participation.
Thus, it is necessary to examine the proper roles of the constitutional
principles of due process and fundamental justice on the one hand, and
equal protection and opportunity or benefit on the other, in the review of
educational policy and decision-making. In each instance regard is first
had to the American experience in applying these principles to the field
of education before an analysis is made of the Canadian situation and the
likely impact of the Charter on the right to an education.
V. Due Process and Fundamental Justice in the Educational Setting
1. Due Process: The American Experience
Before undertaking an analysis of the majority opinion in Rodriguez, it
may be helpful to summarize briefly basic precepts of American
constitutional law on due process. Conventionally, the Fifth and
Fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution dealing with
due process have been used in cases involving criminal procedure and
legislation which created unequal classifications for its application.60 The
interpretation of the due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment
58. Haggerty & Sacks, "Education of the Handicapped: Towards a Definition of an
Appropriate Education" (1977), 50 Temple L.Q. 961 at 982.
59. The standard proposed has been utilized by many courts in litigation under TheEducadon
For AllHandicapped Children Aci Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 775 (codified as amended at
20 U.S.C. No's. 1401-1461 (1976 & Supp. 111 1979). See: Frederick L v. Thomas, 419 F.
Supp. 960 (E.D. Pa., 1976), aff'd 557 F. 2d 373 (3d Circ. 1977).
60. See generally, Tribe, supra, note 18.
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has fluctuated between the specific guarantees of the Fifth Amendment,
notions of substantive due process and a "natural law" orientation.
6'
However, the flexible instrumental approach to due process principles
which has emerged from recent Supreme Court decisions makes due
process considerations applicable to the field of education as a means of
ensuring students equal protection of the law and also as a means to
protect their substantive interests of personality.
Primarily, due process principles would be applicable in the context of
disciplinary actions such as suspension or dismissal. However, an attempt
could be made to apply due process requirements to the more substantive
aspects of the educational process such as the grading of examinations or
clinical performance. Also, by applying due process requirements to such
aspects of educational policy as tracking, or the distribution of college-
bound as opposed to vocational programs available in certain school
districts, arbitrary patterns of resource allocation could be challenged.
The procedural and substantive areas of educational policy for which
a litigant may seek judicial review under the due process clause fall
within the dichotomy developed in the cases between procedural and
substantive due process.
Having identified a specific state policy, one can ask, substantively,
whether the content of that policy comports with various constitutional
limits on the ends government may pursue and the means it may employ.
Given an attempted invocation of the policy to someone's disadvantage,
one can ask, procedurally, whether the application of the policy has been
sufficiently accurate as a means of implementing its purposes.
62
After developing the traditional structure of due process analysis, regard
is had to a novel tripartite basis of analysis in due process litigation
proposed by Lawrence H. Tribe.
(a) Due Process: The Traditional View
In due process litigation, the preliminary question to be determined by
the courts is whether the state action complained of threatens a protected
liberty or property interest. Then the nature of the process required to
ensure constitutional protection of the interest in question must be
61. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1883). In this case the Supreme Court allowed the
state of California to abolish indictment by grand jury in criminal trials and adopt prosecution
by information despite the existence of Fifth Amendment guarantees of trial by jury. "Since the
substitution of prosecution by information... did not impair the right to a judicial trial on the
merits, it did not offend the due process concept. Thus was laid the foundation for a concept
of procedural due process, divorced from the specifically enumerated procedural limitations of
the Bill of Rights and oriented toward the broadly conceived 'fair trial' standard". Kauper,
Frontiers of Constitutional Liberty 152 (The Thomas M. Cooley Lectures, 7th Series, 1956).
62. Tribe, "Structural Due Process" (1975), 10 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 268-321, at 290.
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identified. In recent years the United States Supreme Court has
developed a utilitarian interest-balancing approach to the nature of the
process it will require. By tailoring the structure of the review required to
the specific circumstances of the litigation of which it is seized, the Court
has expanded the scope of procedural due process principles while
simultaneously attempting to avoid unduly burdening the administrative
structure established by the legislature.
Both American federal and state courts have accepted the basic
premise that an individual's interest in receiving an education is properly
classified as a protected interest deserving of some form of constitutional
protection.63 The due process clause, thus, may be invoked if the
individual's interest in an education is classified as a property interest and
the administrative action complained of does not constitute merely de
minimis deprivation.64 It is necessary to note that an appeal under the due
process clause need not be based on arguments which assert a
constitutional right to an education. Protected interests in property
generally are not founded in the Constitution. "Rather, they are created
and their dimensions are defined by an independent source such as state
statutes or rules entitling the citizen to certain benefits. '65
In two student disciplinary cases, Goss v. Lopez, 66 and Ingraham v.
Wright,67 the Supreme Court recognized that students possessed
substantial interests which deserved due process protection. In Goss, the
10-day suspension of students charged with disruptive and disobedient
conduct in connection with a series of student demonstrations was held
to be in violation of constitutional protection afforded by the due process
clause.68 In Ingraham, while the court did not impose due process
principles on educational authorities, because the risk of punishment
being excessive or unnecessary was met by adequate redress from tort
remedies and criminal sanctions, it was recognized that the practice of
imposing corporal punishment without either notice to the student or
allowing him a chance to be heard did impinge on a student's interest in
"freedom from bodily restraint and punishment."69
63. Se" Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Ingraham v. Wright 430 U.S. 651 (1977);
Serrano v. Pfies4 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971); Mills v. Bd of Educadon, 348 F. Supp. 866 (1972).
64. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) at 481 (a court must look to the nature of the
interest rather than its weight). See also Note, "Due Process, Due Politics and Due Respect:
Three Models of Legitimate School Governance" (1981), 94 Harv. L. R. 1104.
65. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) at 577.
66. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 465 (1975).
67. Ingraham v. Wright 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
68. "The student's interest is to avoid unfair or mistaken conclusion from the educational
process, with all of its unfortunate consequences". Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) at 579.
69. Ingraham v. Wrigh 430 U.S. 651 (1977) at 672-74. The Court also implied that under
an instrumental analysis the costs of providing procedural safeguards could be considered
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Traditionally, in imposing due process requirements the courts have
required that common law procedural guarantees be followed 7° although
the type of procedure imposed varies widely with the circumstances
presented. While it has been suggested that due process procedural
requirements are generally imposed to minimize risks of error, such a
limitation of the due process concept cannot be supported by
jurisprudence. 71 Due process has continually been interpreted as
extending beyond a review of the minimum conceptual standard essential
to a fair trial to encompass an examination of evidence bearing on the
standards adopted.
In Goss, the Supreme Court established a skeletal procedural
framework for the review of suspensions and dismissals.72 A more
elaborate review procedure, the Court held, would be impractical
considering the number of brief disciplinary suspensions and the
administrative costs of allowing students to secure counsel and cross-
examine witnesses.73 The interest-balancing engaged in by the Court is
clearly evident. The student's interest in not being deprived of the benefits
of an education are weighed against both the administrative costs of
implementing due process proceedings, and the effect of instituting such
proceedings on the practice of using suspensions as a disciplinary
measure74 - a procedure which the Court recognized as a valid.
Much has been written since the Goss decision, criticizing the
instrumental analysis utilized by the Court to determine the nature of the
process due. Nevertheless, it does appear that because the Court did
impose only a skeletal procedural requirement on educational authorities,
the decision attempts to accommodate non-legal values, such as a
progressive and participatory conception of the proper mode of
excessive when compared with the perceived educational gain. While there seems to be little
divergence of opinion on the manner in which the courts determine the existence of a liberty
or property interest deserving of due process protection, the Supreme Court's use of
instrumental analysis to determine the type of process due has raised a storm of criticism and
controversy.
70. See generally, Tribe, supra, note 18, as to these requirements.
71. Due process has been invoked to protect the right to work (Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33
(1915)) and the right to teach a foreign language (Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
72. A student who faced suspension would have to be given "some kind of notice and afforded
some kind of heaing... the timing and content of the notice and the nature of the hearing
will depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing interests involved". Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) at 579.
73. "To impose in each such case even truncated trial-type procedures might well overwhelm
administrative facilities ... and, by diverting resources, cost more than it would save in
educational effectiveness .... [F]urther formalizing the suspension process and escalating its
formality and adversary nature may not only make it too costly ... but also destroy its
effectiveness as part of the teaching process". Id, at 583.
74. See Note, supra, note 64, at 1111.
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governance in public education institutions. However, when compared
with the application of the instrumental analysis in Ingraham, where the
Court declined to impose any due process limitations before school
authorities could administer corporal punishment, the strength of the
instrumental analysis model as predicative of the actions of the Court
may be called into question: "The utility calculations are so crude and
provide a standard so elastic as to justify virtually any conclusion." 75
Any model of analysis in due process cases adopted by the courts must
be tailored to accommodate the historical concerns which led to the
development of a residuary procedural guarantee, and the circumstances
surrounding the deprivation of the interest in question. Therefore, a strict
model of interpretation of the due process clause is incompatible with its
function as a residuary procedural guarantee of fairness.
76
Freezing the meaning of due process, which in the final analysis is
more a moral command that a strictly jural precept, destroys the chief
virtue of its generality: its elasticity.77 The flexibility of the formulation of
due process requirements in Goss may not only be considered the
strength of the judgment, but also a proper basic principle on which to
base future judicial forays into educational policy under due process
requirements.
The concept of constitutional limitations of due process arise from the
perception that governmental power is potentially destructive of the
conditions of individual freedom. 78 In addition to offering protection to
interests which constitute conditions of individual freedom, due process
principles ensure the individual of an appropriate remedy for the
vindication of private rights.79 An interest which is recognized as
deserving of due process protection, then, should not be deprived of such
protection by an overtly formalistic analytical model which may deny the
individual an appropriate remedy. While this approach is open to the
criticism that it is vague and raises the question whether there was
constitutional warrant for process so little like adjudication,80 a second
interpretation of the Court's holding seems to have been overlooked.
75. Tribe, supra, note 18, at 540.
76. "Thus the guarantees of due process, though having their roots in Magna Carta's "per
legem terrae' and considered as procedural safeguards 'against executive usurpation and
tyranny', have in this country become bulwarks also against arbitrary legislation". Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516 (1883) at 532.
77. Kadish, "Methodology & Criteria in Due Process Adjudication - A Survey and
Criticism" (1957), 66 Yale L.J. 319 at 341.
78. "In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed,- and in the
next place oblige it to control itself'. The Federalist No. 51, at p. 337 (Modern Lib. ed).
79. Mott, Due Process ofLaw 292 (1973).
80. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing" (1975), 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267.
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An earlier line of Supreme Court decisions - West Virginia v.
Barrette,81 to Tinker v. Des Moines82 - simply had extended general
constitutional principles to the student/teacher relationship. 83 Clearly,
however, such principles must be modified within the educational setting
to allow for the effective management of schools and students.
Nevertheless, with the ruling in Goss, the Court gave notice to
educational authorities that they would intervene to ensure some minimal
protection for the exercise of student's constitutional rights against
arbitrary decisions.
Cases which followed Goss - Ingraham v. Wright84 and Horowitz v.
Board of Curators of the University of Missour85 - need not be viewed
as a retreat by the Court in upholding its earlier decisions to extend
constitutional principles to the educational setting.
In Ingraham, as already noted, the Court found that while a student's
interest in freedom from bodily restraint and punishment was deserving
of Fourteenth Amendment protection, it did not require procedural
guarantees given that adequate alternative avenues of redress existed.
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell characterized the issue as the
determination of the educational value of corporal punishment, a policy
decision of such magnitude that was best left to "normal processes of
community debate and legislative action". 86 Mandating procedural
requirements for some instances of punishment would require the
formulation of broad principles applicable to punishment generally. The
Court was also of the view that, even under the instrumental analysis,
such procedures should not be imposed - notwithstanding that the need
for procedural safeguards was clear - because they would saddle the
school authorities with excessive costs. The Ingraham decision is
reconcilable with Goss in so much as it recognizes the case law which
extends constitutional principles to the school setting and supports the
instrumental analysis model as a method of determining what process is
due. Ingraham, however, should not be considered strong precedent on
the issue of the application of due process principles in the educational
setting, because the Court then goes on to characterize the issue as one of
policy, and justifies its holding on policy grounds.
In Horowitz, the plaintiff student alleged that she had been dismissed
from medical school for poor academic performance without due process
81. West Virginia v. Barrete, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
82. Y7nker v. Des Moines Independent Community SchoolDistriMt 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
83. Wright, "The Constitution on Campus" (1969), 22 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1027 at 1059.
84. Ingraham v. Wright 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
85. Horowitz v. Board of Curators of the University of Missour 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
86. Ingraham v. Wright 430 U.S. 651 (1977) at 681.
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of law. The court avoided deciding whether due process requirements
should extend to academic dismissals, holding that on the facts presented
it was unnecessary to determine whether an academic dismissal from
professional school infringed a constitutionally-protected interest.
87
Nonetheless, the Court was unanimous in holding that, if a
constitutionally-protected interest had been found to exist, the elaborate
review procedures provided by the University satisfied Fourteenth
Amendment requirements. The judgment unexplainably then goes on to
analyze the competing interests involved and cites the risk of
"deterioration of many beneficial aspects of the student-faculty
relationship," and the perception that a due process hearing would be
"useless or harmful in finding out the truth as to scholarship" as grounds
for concluding that even the minimal hearing outlined in Goss is not
required in academic dismissals.
88
In Horowitz, the majority view was that due process principles should
be confined in their application to disciplinary procedures: academic
judgments were of necessity "more subjective and evaluative than the
typical factual questichs presented in the average disciplinary decision."8 9
But a distinction between objective determinable facts and subjective
valuation is unsuited to the educational setting. All disciplinary actions
encompass a subjective valuation as to the individual's culpability;
conversely, academic evaluations incorporate a significant portion of
objectively determinable facts - leaving such considerations as the form
and grammar used by the student aside - the main question to be
determined being whether the responses given were correct.90
One commentator has characterized Ingraham and Horowitz as a
radical break with traditional modes of due process analysis in that the
concern of the Court shifts from the accuracy of the process to the
legitimacy of the process.91 Another has observed:
On the one hand, the procedural approximation (of consent) would seem
to be the fullest possible participation in the decisional process. On the
other hand, notions of expertise and majoritarian consensus represent
classic bases of authority. Decisions are legitimated either by the
professionalism of the schoolmaster (Horowitz) or by local democratic
control of schools (Ingraham).92
87. Horowitz v. Board of Curators of the University of Missour, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) at 86,
n. 3.
88. Id, at 87.
89. Id, at90.
90. Justice Powell acknowledged the strain inherent in building a distinction on the bases of
objective as opposed to subjective facts in his concurring judgement. Id, at 95.
91. Tribe, supra, note 18, at 560.
92. Note, supra note 64, at 1121.
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Furthermore,
[W]hen the claim being advanced is that the processes are not legitimate
- that they do not conform with due process of law - then more is
required than the observation that the processes are... "professional" or
"democratic." 93
Classifying due process requirements as alternatively seeking to ensure
the accuracy of a decision, or seeking to legitimate a decision, may be an
erroneous truncation of the due process clause. It is submitted that, from
a historical standpoint as well as in modem judgments, the Fourteenth
Amendment is recognized as performing both a legitimating function and
a jural function, in the sense of ensuring the accuracy of information
presented. Therefore, the main issue in evaluating the analytical model
adopted by the judiciary is not whether it favours the legitimation over
the jural function; rather, once again, the issue is how well the model
protects individual rights.
Of the three decisions examined, Goss emerges as the model of due
process analysis best suited to application within the educational setting.
Unlike the decisions in Ingraham and Horowitz, Goss clearly specifies the
individual interest deserving of protection and establishes a flexible
framework of review which adapts with the severity of the deprivation to
be imposed. Furthermore, the extension by Goss of constitutional
principles to the educational setting follows a number of earlier decisions
assuring free exercise of the constitutional rights by students within the
school setting.94 Both Ingraham and Horowitz, by comparison, simply
decline to involve the courts in educational issues on the basis of policy
considerations.
Constitutional due process guarantees represent a residual procedural
safeguard to ensure the individual an appropriate remedy for the
vindication of his rights.95 If the courts are to defer their power of review
on such bases, relying on local debate and the democratic process to
ensure the vindication of private rights, constitutional due process
guarantees will be meaningless in any area of public policy which the
court characterizes as overly technical or complex. 96 With the growing
93. ld, at 1123.
94. See, eg., West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community SchoolDistrici; 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
95. Mott, supra, note 79, at 292.
96. One can compare the attitude of the Courts in enforcing desegregation, which has required
a virtual flood of litigation and court decrees (Emerson, Haber & Dorsen, Political and Civil
Rights in the United States, c. 17-18 (3rd ed. 1967); and Bickel, "The Decade of School
Desegregation: Progress and Prospects" (1964), 64 Colum. L. Rev. 193, to the early negative
reactions of the Courts to educational malpractice claims (Peter W v. San Francisco United
School Distric 131 Cal. Rpt. 854 (1976); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Distric
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number and importance of government entitlements to services and
privileges,97 the need for judicial review in areas of public policy will
increase proportionately.98 Further, denial of responsibility for review of
the decisions of education authorities by the judiciary would be unwise:
"... institutions [such as educational institutions] capable of perpetuating
their habitual norms even after these norms have ceased to reflect
anything like a consensus make a weak case for judicial deference." 99
Due process requirements represent a flexible and effective judicial
vehicle to review the decisions of school authorities.
(b) Substantive Due Process
The Goss formulation of procedural due process can also serve as the
basis of a substantive due process analytical framework. To protect the
individual's basic entitlement to an education, judicial review must
extend beyond the procedural aspects of disciplinary and academic
dismissals. Specifically, problems of resource discrimination which are
perpetuated without substantial justification could be made subject to
judicial review under a model of substantive due process which focused
on "the structures through which policies are both formed and applied,
and formed in the very process of being applied." 10°
The birth of the substantive due process doctrine is credited to the
judgment of Justice Miller in the Slaughterhouse case, 101 in which the
Court reaffirmed the distinction between federal and state spheres of
activity.
The Court thus came to perceive a perfect complementarity between the
citizen's right to "life, liberty and property" and the state's authority to
preserve [such rights] ... through the exercise of its implied powers within
settled common law standards. This complementarity permitted the turn
of the century Court to believe that the federal judiciary could protect
citizen autonomy without intruding upon the state's sphere - because any
state action that invaded the liberty or property of its citizens was, by
definition, beyond the state's sphere. 102
47 N.Y.S. 2d 440 (1978), aff'd 418 N.YS. 2d 375 (1979)). The degree ofjudicial involvement
in the latter category of situations probably would be no greater than that undertaken by the
courts in enforcing desegration, yet the courts assert in malpractice litigation that supervision
of the educational system is too technical and beyond their expertise.
97. Reich, "The New Property ' (1964),73 Yale L.. 733.
98. Reich, "Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues" (1965), 74
Yale U. 1245.
99. Tribe, supra note 62, at 317.
100. Id, at 269.
101. 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1873).
102. Tribe, supra, note 18, at 422.
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From a modem perspective, decisions rendered by the Court under the
substantive due process doctrine were decidedly anti-egalitarian in their
focus. During the so-called "Lochner era" the Court invalidated a series
of minimum wage and labour standard statutes by holding that such
legislation infringed the worker's right to freedom of contract.10 3 To
approach substantive due process litigation from a modem perspective
may dwarf the significance of the theory in a shadow of presentism.
Substantive due process doctrine arose as a result of the perceived need
for the federal judiciary to protect the rights of citizens against state
governments. The perceived function of governments under the public/
private distinction prevalent during the Lochner era was to promote the
total public good:
... any statute which was imposed upon individual or corporations in
order to redistribute resources and thus benefit some persons at the
expense of others (for that is how redistribution was then conceived)
would extend beyond the implicit boundaries of legislative authority. Such
a law would thus violate natural rights of property and contract, rights
lying at the very core of the private domain. 104
Yet where the legislation sought to protect groups considered incapable
of protecting themselves (such as women or minors), state intervention
limiting contractual freedom was upheld.105 Logically, as other groups
came to be regarded as incapable of protecting their interests, government
could introduce protective mechanisms to ensure group interests.
Inconsistency in the application of substantive due process theory
persisted throughout the Lochner era and may have contributed to its
demise in 1937 in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.10 6
For present purposes, the substantive due process model is significant
because it invokes judicial review where implied limitations on
government action have been breached. Immediately the issue arises as to
how such implied limitations are to be developed and applied. Certainly
it can no longer be argued that a "natural" social or economic order exists
which the courts may validly prevent the legislature from upsetting. The
Courts, then, must either imply limitations from normative standards or
defer to the institutional competence and authority of government or
103. It should also be noted that the Court upheld more legislation than it invalidated during
the "Lochner era". Compare" Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. (1905) (invalidating state 10 hr.
daity/60 hr. weekly maximum employment hours legislation), with Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding a maximum hours statute for minors). For a comprehensive
treatment of the "Lochner era" see Small, ed., The Constitution of the United States 1392-99,
1427-87 (1964 ed.).
104. Tribe, supra, note 18, at 439.
105. See eg., Mullerv. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
106. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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administrative bodies. Whatever the choice, there is an assumption of
power by the judiciary - they retain the discretion to decide whether or
not to intervene in any given situation. 107
As long as judges do not fully and irrevocably repudiate the mission of
occasionally rejecting majoritarian political choices, there is no honest way
for them to escape the burdens of substantive judgement in every case.
Now of course the right substantive judgement cannot be wholly
insensitive to matters of institutional competence and democratic
legitimacy. 08
Tribe's structural due process model attempts to incorporate the
flexibility of substantive due process doctrine and place the concept of
individual participation in the democratic process - one of the oldest
and most basic democratic values - as the normative standard on which
implied limitations on government can be constructed so as to legitimize
judicial review in the area of egalitarian liberties.
(c) Structural Due Process Theory
A major stumbling block to active judicial review of educational policies,
in both Canada and the United States, is a constitutional division of
powers which awards primary jurisdiction over education to local
(provincial or state) government. In the United States, the power of the
state to regulate affairs within its jurisdiction has been subject to
limitation by fundamental law,'09 tests of minimum rationality," 0 and
tests based on "suspect classifications", or dealing with "constitutionally
fundamental" interests."'
Any attempt to challenge resource discrimination between school
districts on a substantive basis as constituting an infringement of a
constitutional right would be hard-pressed to escape the holding in
Rodriguez"2 - indeed, it would seem that the majority of educational
policy decisions would pass substantive due process requirements as a
valid exercise of state power. But under traditional procedural due
process theory, litigants could attempt to establish an entitlement to an
107. Tribe, supr, note 18, at 454.
108. Id
109. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
110. O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974).
111. See, eg., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (race); Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (wealth); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission,
334 U.S. 410 (1948) (national origin).
112. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The Court
denied everything above a minimum quantum of education the status of a constitutionally
fundamental interest and dismissed district wealth as suspect classification in state financing
schemes.
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education arising from compulsory attendance laws, and argue that
resource discrimination constituted a substantive deprivation of that
entitlement. 1 3
The issue to be determined at the hearing would be twofold: (1) Was
there in fact resource discrimination as complained of by the litigants
which resulted in substantial deprivation? and (2) Was the policy on
which such discrimination was based - for example, school funding
primarily through local property tax revenues - violative of due process
requirements? Given that the establishment of resource allocation
schemes has been characterized by the Court in Rodriguez as a matter of
policy and thus outside the scope of procedural due process review, 114 on
what basis can the court play a more active role in protecting individual
rights adversely affected by such decisions while escaping the arbitrary
substantive limitations on legislative power?
A possible solution has been suggested by Tribe. He argues that in
certain situations, areas in which policy determinations need to reflect
rapidly changing norms and affect important individual interests in
liberty and property, due process principles may require a shift from the
examination of the structure or application of determinate rules to a
system of individualized hearings.115 In areas where no concrete social
consensus exists, review processes must somehow be made more
responsive than simply administering a determinate rule: "... from an
instrumental viewpoint, such rule boundedness hinders the eventual
coalescence of a new social consensus about the area of current flux". 1 6
Indeed the courts have intervened in issues "at least partly frozen by
113. Once the entitlement was established (and, after all, in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975) entitlement to a public education was classified as a property interest) and, assuming
the evidentiary burden of demonstrating the link between resource discimination and the
quality of educational services could be discharged, the deprivation would be subject to the
normal constitution standards of due process (regardless of any statutory procedures afforded
to contest such policies) if the procedures fell short of traditional constitutional standards. The
litigants would thus be entitled to a hearing. The requisite procedure to be followed at the
hearing would be determined by the severity of the deprivation precipitated by the resource
discrimination unless (as was the case in Goss) it could be argued that a hearing with full
procedural protections, including the right to lead evidence and cross-examine witnesses, was
intrinsically worthwhile where the litigants claimed infringement of "substantive values" (equal
educational opportunity) which affected their "personal dignity and self-respect". Id, at 584.
114. "We have here nothing less than a direct attack on the way in which Texas has chosen
to raise and disburse state and local tax revenues. We are asked to condemn the State's
judgement... In so doing, appellees would have the Court intrude in an area in which it has
traditionally deferred to state legislatures. This Court has often admonished against such
interferences with the State's fiscal policies ... " San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) at 40.
115. See generally, Tribe, supra, note 62.
116. Id, at 307.
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institutional constraints" on which there "was good reason for supposing
that the normal processes of legislative accommodation to changing
values would not function adequately"."1
7
Education is generally accepted as a significant property interest." 8
The practice of resource discrimination in education has already been
pronounced by a number of state courts to be contrary to constitutional
principles." 9 Furthermore, there is no fixed social consensus as to how
the public educational system may be equitably funded. In forming and
administering educational fiscal policy, due process principles should be
construed as a legitimation process which assures the individual of a
chance for effective participation in the policy making process. 120 Policy
formulation in sensitive areas in education should be legitimated through
a structure which facilitates dialogue between the participants and the
state rather than being dictated by jurisdiction or legitimated by the
professionalization of the bureaucrats responsible. Regulation of the
structure of dialogue - as opposed to the substantive content of state
policy - arguably, is within traditional conceptions of judicial due
process review.
In issues involving disadvantaged students, to rely on the legislative
process for change or reform in the educational setting is to misconstrue
the nature of educational consumers as a legislative constituency. The
objectives of the numerous interest groups involved in the educational
setting, and the objectives of individuals not involved in any formal
educational lobby, are so widely divergent that sustained political
pressure around a single issue would be highly problematic.'
2'
Furthermore, if the attainment of literacy is the basic right to be achieved
through the public educational structure, that right cannot meaningfully
be protected merely by the exercise of judicial control over the right of
117. Id, at 317.
118. Gossv.Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
119. Serrano v. Pi'es 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971); Robinson v. Cahill 303 A. 2d 273 (1973); Van
Dusartz v. Hatflel, 334 E Supp. 870 (Minn. 1971), Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W. 2d 457
(1972), rehearing granted 1973.
120. "The continuing structure of the dialogue between the state and those whose liberties its
laws constrain (structural due process) seems no less appropriate a concern of the judiciary
than either the substance of laws (substantive due process) or procedures by which agreed-
upon rules are applied to varying factual circumstances (procedural due process)". Tribe,
supra, note 62, at 310.
121. The conflicting forces evident in the debates over the proper course to be followed by the
public educational system in the 1800s (discussed in Wishy, supra, note 29) remain dominant
in current educational policy debates, albeit couched in more sophisticated terms. See
generally, Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Private Wealth and Public Education (1970).
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access to education and minimal control over the dispersion of
resources.1
22
In the area of educational finance it is possible to construct a structure
which reflects individual and community concerns as to what constitutes
appropriate levels of education. The educational output model would
place the burden on the school district to demonstrate that sufficient
funds are being expended to assure that each child capable of learning has
the opportunity to achieve the level of functional literacy. Where the state
authorities have enacted the Illinois model that entitles each child to be
educated to the extent of his capabilities, the structural due process model
considered may require individualized assessment by government
authorities of the expressed needs of educational districts. The actual plan
of distribution and collection of funds would remain a legislative decision
which must be exercised in accordance with recognized constitutional
principles such as equal protection. Requiring state authorities to consider
the reality of individual districts demonstrates judicial concern for the
quality of dialogue between the state and citizen.'
23
The call for judicial regulation of structures of dialogue is based on the
assumption that confrontation is the best method of protecting individual
rights.
Fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts
decisive of rights ... Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking and self-
righteousness gives too slender an assurance of rightness. No better
instrument has been devised ... than to give a person in jeopardy of a
serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.124
122. The Supreme Court has not hesitated to intervene in other areas "at least partly frozen
by institutional constraints". (Tribe, supra, note 62, at 317). For example, the complexity of the
abortion issue in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the tax enforcement of prohibitive
sanctions against wealthy private clinics, the involvement of religious principles and the nascent
state of female liberation advocacy) "was good reason for supposing that the normal processes
of legislative accommodation to changing values would not function adequately" (Tribe, supra,
note 62, at 317). Similarly, when the State of Illinois passed a law barring death-scrupled jurors
from juries, it was struck down by the Court, in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 319 U.S. 510 (1968),
as violative of Eighth amendment due process requirements: "... one of the most important
functions any jury can perform in (selecting a punishment) is to maintain a link between
contemporary community values and the penal system - a link without which the
determination of punishment could hardly reflect the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society" (at 519). The Witherspoon decision creates a structure
through which the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment may
be linked to evolving community sentiments.
123. Indeed, a proper interchange of ideas between citizen and state should be recognized as
an instrumental force in the evolution and adaptation of the legal system to the society it serves.
124. Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) at 170 & 171-172 per
Frankfurter J., concurring.
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Within the educational setting, individualized hearings would afford the
individual greater opportunity to protect substantive interests, even if
only by eliminating determinate policies and opening individualized
decisions to judicial review on independent constitutional principles such
as the equal protection clause. The task of identifying areas of moral flux
and normative transition can be left to the courts in the same manner that
the task of identifying fundamental constitutional interests or combines is
left to them. Principles of identification will also evolve as a society
matures.'25 The interests involved are simply too fundamental to be lost
in legal concerns of the structure of federalism, philosophies of judicial
review, and arguments of legitimation through professionalization.126
Due process principles, therefore, represent a potent source of
legitimacy for increased judicial review within the educational setting,
given it has been widely recognized as a substantial interest deserving of
such protection. In Goss, the Supreme Court established a flexible
formula by which due process principles may be applied to school
disciplinary proceedings. Once the court has determined the nature of the
entitlement to be protected, it can then apply an instrumental analysis in
which the severity of the deprivation is considered in conjunction with
the interests of administrative efficiency to determine the nature of the
process due. The Goss formulation of flexible due process based on a
balancing of interests can serve as a theoretical basis to extend due
process protection to areas such as academic dismissals, or even policy
decisions such as those mandating resource discrimination.
The model of "structural" due process outlined by Tribe would allow
for increased judicial review of the formation of educational policies and
structures through which policies resulting in substantive deprivation are
formulated and implemented. By requiring individualized hearings in
areas of educational policy in normative transition, the individual would
be afforded greater opportunity to participate in policy formulation.
Recognition of the need for dialogue between the citizen and the state
would allow nascent or emerging social consensus on sensitive policy
issues to penetrate the self-perpetuating cycle of determinate bureaucratic
designs; and provision of a minimal structure which the dialogue should
125. "What emerges, therefore, is probably not a 'doctrine' of structural due process at all but
rather ... a w¢ay, obviously not free of risk, for cours to facilitate, and take part in the
evolution of moral and thus legal consciousness" (Tribe, supra, note 62, at 321).
126. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) at 44, the
majority noted the possible deleterious effects of deciding in favor of the Appellees under the
Fourteenth Amendment. In Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435
U.S. 78 (1978) at 90, the Court emphasized the professionalism of the decision-makers as a
grounds for denying procedural review.
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follow would enable the courts to review arbitrary policies without
imposing substantive limitations on the exercise of state power.
2. Pnnciples of Fundamental Justice: A Canadian Perspective
Guarantees of procedural review under section 7 of the Charter ofRights
and Freedoms may be an equally flexible mechanism for encouraging
active judicial review within the educational setting. Section 7 of the
Charter, in its reference to principles of fundamental justice, adopts as a
minimum the common law formulation of procedural fairness embodied
in the principles of natural justice. Government interference with private
rights is prohibited "except in accordance with principles of fundamental
justice".127
The history and tradition of procedural review at common law - the
"rules of natural justice" - differ substantially from the American due
process model. However, in the recent Supreme Court of Canada
judgment in the Reference Re Section 94(2) of the B.C. Motor Vehicles
Ac4128 the Court has interpreted the phrase "fundamental justice" to
encompass more than mere natural justice principles; that is, it affords
more than procedural protections to the aggrieved individual. Thus the
Supreme Court has moved general administrative law principles closer to
the more expansive interpretation found under the American due process
model. A brief review of the history of judicial review under the rules of
natural justice is useful before positing a synopsis of modern
administrative law principles.
(a) Natural Justice: The Traditional View
Principles of natural justice are often defined by reference to basic
common law principles: the rule of law, audi alteram partem, and nemo
judex in causa sua 19 The rule of law is traditionally defined as equality
in the application of the law:
The idea of legal order and the rule of law can only be meaningful as a
solution to the tensions in a liberal consciousness. The image of law as
blind, disregarding all differences between persons except those authorized
by law, only makes sense to those who see substantial differences in rank
and power between persons and yet believe that these differences are not
fully legitimate.130
127. Section 7 of the Charter states: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with principles of
fundamental justice."
128. Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicles Ac [1986]1 W.W.R. 481 (S.C.C.).
129. Collin v. Lussier, [1983] 1 EC. 218 at 240 (T.D.).
130. Trubeck, "Complexity and Contradiction in the Legal Order. Balbus and the Challenge
of Critical Social Thought About Law" (1971), 11 Law & Soc. Rev. 529 at 546.
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And the maxims audi alteram partem and nemo judex in causa sua
embody standard common law notions of the type of procedural
safeguards required to ensure the fair and impartial nature of the
adjudicative process. In other words, the common law notions of natural
justice were concerned primarily with upholding the legitimacy of the
adjudication process.'3'
The law developed along two basic lines: limiting the availability of
procedural review to adjudicative or quasi-judicial settings, and
restricting the scope of review to procedural rather than substantive
issues. Thus, traditionally, a court could review a decision under
principles of natural justice, only if the decision-maker was performing a
judicial or quasi-judicial function. A departure from this narrow
formalistic approach occured in Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Police
Commissioners Board,32 in which the Supreme Court extended the
availability of review to bodies exercising solely administrative functions
where such bodies acted arbitrarily or unfairly. However, the decision
neither enlarged the scope of procedural protections available nor
introduced an element of substantive review. Judicial review was simply
more widely available. 33
The formalism, inherent in the initial categorization of a function as
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative is also apparent in the structure
of remedies available under the rules of natural justice and fairness.
134
Traditional natural justice theory, then, may be viewed as a series of
categorizations: once the function in question is categorized as judicial or
131. Standard protections such as prior notice, a right to a hearing, opportunity to adequately
present your case, and a right to an impartial decision based on the evidence presented, are
considered generally as sufficient for a tribunal to discharge its procedural obligations under
natural justice theory. See D. Gibson, "Enforcement of the Canadian Charter of Rights &
Freedoms", in Tarnopolsky & Beaudoin, ed's., The Canadian Charter of Rights & Freedoms
489(1982).
132. [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311.
133. Even with the broader standard of fairness set out in Nicholsot commentators seemed
reluctant to argue that the new standard could incorporate substantive review elements. See
Mullan, "Fairness: The New Natural Justice" (1975), 25 U.T.L.J. 281; Macdonald, "Judicial
Review and Procedural Fairness in Administrative Law" (1980), 25 McGill L.J. 520; Grey,
"The Duty to Act Fairly After Nicholson" (1980), 25 McGill L.J. 598; Loughlin, "Procedural
Fairness: A Study of the Crisis in Administration Law Theory" (1978), 28 U.T.L.J. 215.
134. Writs of certiorari and mandamus are most commonly invoked in natural justice
litigation. Certiorari is generally described as a supervisory device over lower courts for
mistake or error of fact. As the functions of a writ of certiorari expanded, the writ of mandamus
evolved into a catch-all remedy available "whenever no other remedy lay". "The grounds for
invoking these remedies became relatively stable during the early 19th century, when
jurisdictional control by certiorari became preeminent; by the time of the Judicature Acts, a
coherent law of judicial review could be said to have emerged" (Macdonald, supra, note 133,
at 528). A writ of certiorari is only available where the function of the public authority may
be classified asjudicial or quasijudicial.
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quasi-judicial, the requisite procedure can be constructed from the basic
principles of a right to be heard by an impartial body. The remedy
available must then be determined by the initial categorization as judicial
or quasi-judicial and the circumstances of the case.135 Indeed, innovations
in administrative law principles seem to founder on the long history of
categorization and the conception that implied procedural or substantive
review of administrative decisions is inimical to traditional common law
notions of parliamentary sovereignty. However, the unprecedented
multiplication of administrative agencies possessing boardly framed
powers which may affect life and liberty interests has spurred
administrative law to a less formalistic approach: the fairness doctrine.
Under the fairness doctrine, Mullan suggests that the primary issue
before the court should be characterized as follows: "What procedural
protections, if any, are necessary for this particular decision-making
process?"'31 6 Rather than viewing procedural protections as legitimate
only in an adjudicative context, Mullan proposes that the extent of
procedural protection required be directly related to the seriousness of the
consequences to be suffered by the individual (or the weight of the
individual's interest threatened by the actions of the public authority) and
the circumstances of the case. 137 By asking "What procedural protections
... are necessary?", the fairness doctrine enables a direct functional
assessment of both the weight of the individual's interest and the
administrative or efficiency requirements of the public authority. Thus,
the role of the court in natural justice litigation under the fairness model
could be characterized as a two-step process: initially, the court would
weigh the interests of the parties to determine whether the threat to
individual interests was sufficient to attract procedural protection; then,
the structure of procedural protection required would be tailored to the
characteristics of the individual public authority to allow for
administrative efficiency while protecting individual rights.
Proponents of the fairness doctrine cite two major advantages to its
adoption: it would eliminate the need for an initial categorization of the
function of the public authority as judicial or administrative, and it would
135. Id1 Macdonald maintains that the structure of procedural supervision at common law is
best explained by reference to its historical beginnings: "The motivation for procedural
supervision flowed less from natural law theory than from the desires of the court of King's
Bench to impose its own procedures upon bodies subject to its control.... If supervisory
control of procedures is divorced from the theory of jurisdiction rationes materiae and linked
instead to the process of adversarial adjudication... an alternative intellectual justification for
the concept of implied procedural review must be developed." Id, at 529.
136. Mullan, supra, note 133, at 315.
137. 1,d, at 300.
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introduce increased flexibility in the remedies available to vindicate the
interest threatened as provided in section 24(1) of the Charter.
Opponents of the fairness doctrine consider the doctrine to be an ad hoc
structure incapable of providing any basic principles to guide judicial
review. The lack of basic principles inherent in the case-by-case approach
adopted may entail an over judicalization of administrative procedure,
which would paralyze administrative bodies validly endowed with
powers to regulate by legislation.
1 38
It is necessary, therefore, to examine the basic premises of the fairness
doctrine to determine the effect of Re Section 94(2) of the B.C. Motor
Vehicle Act 139 on the current law of procedural review, and project the
relevance of procedural review arguments to the educational setting.
(b) Principles of Fundamental Justice in the Administrative Setting
In the Canadian setting, administrative and constitutional law mingle
where the interest claimed by the applicant can be characterized as
constitutionally protected; that is, a matter of life, liberty, or security of
the person. To bring the individual's interest in an education under the
protection of section 7 of the Charter, it is necessary to establish the
nature of the right and the infringement or denial complained of.
140
The scope of Charter rights must be determined through a purposive
analysis:
The meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter was to be
ascertained by an analysis of the purpose of such a guarantee; ... [this
must be done] by reference to the character and larger objects of the
Charter..., to the language chosen to articulate the specific right, to the
historical origins of the concept enshrined,... [and] to the meaning and
purpose of the other specific rights and freedoms with which it is
associated ... The interpretation should be a generous rather than a
legalistic one.141
A right to an education, it is suggested, should be implicitly recognized in
the specific constitutional guarantees of either a right to liberty or a right
to security of the person.
138. Mullan vigorously denies that the case-by-case approach dictated by the fairness doctrine
is ad hoc. Such an approach "does not mean that the law must necessarily lack principle....
Ilt should be possible to develop principles which will assist the court in performing its
function properly - that function being the placing of the particular decision-making power
in the right place on the spectrum which represents the varying content of the rules of natural
justice." Id, at 301.
139. Re Section 94(2) oftheBC. Motor VehiclesAc [1986] 1 W.W.R. 481 (S.C.C.).
140. Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 440 at 481.
141. R. v. BigMDrugMar:, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 344.
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The right to liberty under the Charter has yet to be considered fully by
the Supreme Court of Canada. If a broad, purposive analysis of the right
to liberty is adopted, then a right to an education should be embraced
within it for education has been considered historically as an element
inherent to the dignity and liberty of the individual. State intervention in
the provision of educational services and the development of a public
educational system, from a more fragmented structure of schools
administered by local authorities, was premised upon the belief that an
individual required a minimal level of instruction to escape a life of
dependent ignoraice. 142 The level of educational achievement required
for an individual to become a functioning member of society has
increased. The correlation between knowledge and individual liberty
remains constant and demands constitutional recognition.
In the alternative, an individual's interest in education may be
characterized as an implicit element of the right to security of the person.
The phrase "security of the person" is capable of a broad range of
meaning. 143 Education, though perhaps more easily characterized as a
property right, merits inclusion under the rubric of security of the person,
by virtue of its close nexus with the mental and physical integrity of the
individual. 144
In America a variety of welfare interests have been classified as
proprietary and therefore deserving of due process protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 45 Government benefits such as welfare
payments and education clearly serve the same function as property in
the hands of the individual. Education provides the individual with the
tools with which he may attempt to procure the necessities of life: an
income, an evocation and the ability to exercise basic civil and political
freedoms. 46 But section 7 of the Charter contains no explicit reference to
property as a protected right;147 moreover, the majority of judicial
opinion has held that no implicit protection of property interest was
intended. 4
8
142. Mills, "Inaugural Address Delivered to the University of St. Andrews", in Robson, ed.,
Essays on Equality, Law, and Education 215 at 233 (1984).
143. Singh v. Minister of Employment & Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 178 at 207.
144. See: San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) at 103 per
Marshall J., dissenting.
145. Eg., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (public education); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1969) (welfare benefits).
146. Serrano v. Priest 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971).
147. It should be noted that the provinces resisted the inclusion of the right to property in the
Charter because it was felt that it might hinder their attempts at regional development
planning.
148. See, eg., R. v. Estabrooks Pontiac (1982), 144 D.L.R. (3d) 21 (N.B.Q.B.).
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However, it is suggested that a distinction must be drawn between
property broadly defined as commercial or economic interests, and
proprietary interests which directly and materially affect the security of
the person,149 like education, which are deserving of procedural and
substantive protection under the section 7 guarantee of principles of
fundamental justice. 50 If this distinction has merit then a theory of
judicial review available where the right to an education has been
infringed may be found in principles of fundamental justice as is evident
from the recent Supreme Court decision in Re Section (94(2) of the B.C.
Motor Vehicles Act 151, which expanded the scope of protection afforded
by section 7 of the Charter beyond procedural guarantees.
The issue in Re Section 94(2) of the B.C. Motor Vehicles Act was
whether a strict liability offence which imposed penal consequences
violated principles of fundamental justice. In the criminal law context, the
Court stated, the scope of protection afforded under section 7 includes all
fundamental tenets of the legal system. Thus, Lamer J. pointed out that
the rights enumerated in sections 8-14 should form the basis of any
analysis to determine what procedural or substantive protections would
be required under principles of fundamental justice in a particular
situation. 5
2
... [T]he principles of fundamental justice are to be found in the basic
tenets of our legal system. They do not lie in the realm of general public
policy but in the inherent domain of the judiciary as guardian of the justice
system. Such an approach to the interpretation of "principles of
fundamental justice" is consistent with the wording and structure of s. 7,
the context of the section, Le., sections 8 to 14, and the character and
larger objects of the Charter itself.
53
It is suggested that the objective behind Lamer's J. formulation was to
adopt a test flexible enough to protect the right infringed, yet cautious of
involving the judiciary in public policy issues.
To determine the requirements of fundamental justice where the issue
to be decided is entitlement to government benefits, a similarly broad
focus which addresses the wording, character and larger objects of the
Charter should also be employed. However, no enumerated listing of the
type of procedures which must be afforded when dealing with
149. See eg., the definition of liberty in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922) at 399.
150. "The American courts have adopted broad definitions of property, life, and liberty
interests and determine whether judicial review is appropriate by asking whether the
infringement of the right is 'substantial"'. Mullan also proposes a weighing of interests to
determine whether judicial review is merited. Mullan, supra, note 133, at 315.
151. Re Section 94(2) oftheBC. Motor VehiclesAc4 [1986] 1 W.W.R. 481 (S.C.C.).
152. Id, at 493-496.
153. Id, at 496.
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adjudication over entitlement to government benefits exists within the
Charter. Nevertheless, entitlement to government benefits such as
education are specialized rights which require a comprehensive
protection mechanism. In adopting fundamental justice as the
constitutional standard, the legislature has indicated: "a will to give
greater content to the words 'principles of fundamental justice', the limits
of which were left for the courts to develop but within, of course, the
acceptable sphere of judicial activity."154
Section 7 was conceived to protect the individual from arbitrary and
purposive government restraints which materially affect his life, liberty or
security. The interpretation of the phrase fundamental justice in the
educational setting therefore should protect the integrity and objectives of
the individual's right to an education - in much the same manner, one
could argue, as the right to counsel or any of the other rights enumerated
in sections 8 to 14 protect the accused's right to liberty.
A standard of judicial review capable of protecting the individual's
interest in an education must contain elements of flexibility and restraint.
The constitutionalization of the right to fair procedure has altered
radically the theoretical basis on which a claim to procedural review is to
be considered legitimate. The motivation for procedural supervision has
become based in constitutional law concepts of individual liberty and the
right not to be deprived thereof unless such deprivation can be justified
within the ideological postulates of a free and democratic society. The
scope of procedural review must therefore be expanded.
This expansion can best be achieved under a functional model for
judicial review of educational disputes involving a three-step process.
Initially, the court should determine whether the interest affected falls
within those categories of rights listed in section 7. The onus should then
fall on the applicant to demonstrate that the right is "substantially"
threatened. Finally, where the procedures provided by the public
authority to contest its actions do not conform to basic principles of
fundamental justice, the court should grant an appropriate remedy to
allow the individual to vindicate his rights. Thus, in the educational
setting, principles of fundamental justice could be used to obtain judicial
review of disciplinary actions, academic dismissals, and unequal resource
allocation policies.
Generally, in situations calling for procedural review, it is sufficient to
weigh the extent of the individual interest threatened against the
effectiveness of the decision-making process questioned, and the
administrative costs (both practical and theoretical) of mandating
154. Id
Constitutional Protection of the Right to an Education
additional procedural safeguards. The weight of a student's interest in
continuing his education is substantial. In the absence of a theory of
substantive due process, the argument can be made that dismissals should
be subject to a higher standard of procedural protection than may be
concluded on an initial balancing of the interests and costs involved. To
protect the full extent of an individual's interest in continuing his
education from a purely procedural analysis, the courts must actively
engage in mandating specific review structures - perhaps even
mandating the status of the participants in such structures - and adopt
a no-evidence rule for extreme cases. 155 The standard proposed goes well
beyond the level of review adopted by the American courts; a more
onerous standard of review is required by virtue of the nature of the
interest involved and the general reluctance of the courts to review the
judgment of professional educators. Otherwise, despite being widely
accepted as an interest deserving of constitutional protection, a student's
interest in continuing his education will lack adequate protection from
arbitrary infringements.
Similarly, theories of substantive and structural fundamental justice
would allow judicial review of educational policies which resulted in
resource discrimination, where the application of the policy denies the
claimant the opportunity to defend adequately against governmental
action which is detrimental to his interests. Such an approach would
permit specific inequities that often result from administrative decision-
making - for example, school closings, inequalities in physical facilities,
or widely disparate patterns of program allotment - to be challenged.
The type of procedural protection required in any given context would
depend on the weight of the educational interest infringed by the decision
in question and considerations of administrative efficiency.
Where the harm resulting to an individual from a decision of the
educational authorities is substantial, judicial review should be available.
The burden would rest on government authorities to demonstrate that the
procedural mechanisms adopted were fair and adequate in relation to the
severity of the deprivation to be imposed, and that the administrative
decision in question was demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society.15 6
155. See generally, Grey, supra, note 133.
156. Re Section 94(2) of the BC. Motor Vehicles Ac [1986] 1 W.W.R. 481 (S.C.C.) at 513
per Wilson, : "Ji] the limit on the section 7 fight has been affected through a violation of the
principles of fundamental justice, the inquiry, in my view, ends there and the limit cannot be
sustained under section 1.... I do not believe that a limit on the section 7 right which has
been imposed in violation of the principles of fundamental justice can be either 'reasonable' or
'demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society' .... [A legislature] can only limit the
section 7 right if it does so in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice and, even
if it meets that test, it still has to meet the test in section 1".
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The interplay of the fundamental justice requirement in section 7 and
the reasonableness requirement in section 1 weaves the theories of
substantive and structural due process into a single standard. An
applicant could challenge a decision or policy of the educational
authorities and vindicate his rights by demonstrating either that the
requisite procedure was not followed or, alternatively, that principles of
substantive fundamental justice were violated because the legislation did
not provide him an adequate opportunity to defend his interests.
Incorporated within the substantive requirement that the individual must
be given the proper forum to adequately defend his interests, is the
objective of providing individualized hearings to claimants in areas where
policy determinations need to reflect rapidly changing norms.
157
In the educational setting, where the parties suffer from unequal
bargaining power and unequal access to information, to fully protect an
individual's interest requires more than a purely procedural analysis of
the structure and jurisdiction of educational authorities. Much depends,
then, on how broadly the courts will be willing to interpret the rights of
life, liberty, and security of the persons in deciding which decision-
making authorities are compelled to provide procedural protection.
Despite the fact that procedural protection has attained constitutional
status, one would assume that the courts would remain somewhat
tentative in becoming involved in the administrative process of public
authorities. Nevertheless, an individual's interest in an education may be
characterized as a liberty or security interest under section 7 - a student
possesses the right to receive an education for the prescribed period and
cannot be denied such rights except in accordance with basic
constitutional principles. 58 The responsibility for enforcing such
fundamental rights would then fall to the courts and, to fully protect the
individual's interest, the courts would need to adopt an active supervisory
role in the design of procedural protections. Fundamental justice theory,
like the Fourteenth Amendment, can therefore be used to construct the
parameters of a constitutionally based right to an education.
VI. Equal Protection and Benefit in the Education Setting
1. Basic Principles
Equal protection, like due process, emerged as a moral precept before
being recognized as a legal principle.
157. See discussion of structural due process in the American setting in Tribe, supra, note 62.
158. It should be noted that the Supreme Court of Canada has held that the rights to life,
liberty and security of the person in section 7 and "the right not to be deprived thereof..."
must be read conjunctively and not disjunctively. See: Re Section 94(2) of the B.C. Motor
VehiclesAct [1986] 1 WWR. 481 (S.C.C.) at 494 per Lamer, J.
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Of equality I shall speak, not as a sentiment, but as a principle.... Thus
it is with all moral and political ideas. First appearing as a sentiment they
awake a noble impulse, filling the soul with generous sympathy, and
encouraging to congenial effort. Slowly recognized, they finally pass into
a formula, to be acted upon, to be applied, to be defended in the concerns
of life as principles.
159
Interpretation of the equal protection and equal benefit principle in
section 15(1) of the Charter, or that of equal protection in the Fourteenth
Amendment of the American Constitution, must develop in a manner
which allows it to defend a citizen's daily concerns. Traditionally, equal
protection has been perceived as insulating citizens from the denial of
benefits based on invidious classifications, such as race, gender, or
wealth. 160 Because governments continue to assume a more active role in
the regulation and provision of social services, the citizen's interest in
equal protection extends beyond a right to non-discriminatory treatment
to a right which involves an appropriate or effective level of quality
treatment by government service agencies. It can be argued that equal
protection, in the absence of discrimination, would invalidate all resource
discrimination which lacks substantial justification.
As a constitutional concept, then, equal protection arguments may be
useful in defining the parameters of an "appropriate education" which is
deserving of legal protection. The extension of equal protection principles
to areas of public policy absent of discrimination is not free of peril.
Nonetheless, an historical analysis of the development of equal
opportunity as a legal principle demonstrates that a flexible model of
protection can be constructed.
Theories concerning the proper role of the judiciary in the political
process have heavily influenced the development of equal opportunity
doctrine. Two primary considerations emerge: that the judiciary should
not act as a "super-legislature" and substitute its opinion on social policy
for that of the legislature, which is accountable to its constituents; and
that the judiciary should refrain from adopting an activist stand on social
policy issues for fear of the adverse reaction such involvement may
precipitate against its reputation as a neutral arbiter. It is necessary to
address these concerns in the ensuing discussion of models of equal
protection analysis and the relevance of such models to the field of
education.
159. Frank & Munro, "The Original Understanding of Equal Protection of the Laws" (1950),
50 Col. L. Rev. 131 at 137.
160. Id
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2. Equal Protecdon: The American Experience
Early equal protection doctrine in the United States was largely
prohibitive - states were forced not to discriminate against their
residents on the basis of race with respect to rights of physical security,
property rights, or freedom of movement.161 Under such a narrow
formulation of equal protection doctrine the role of the court is clearly -
and solely - a supervisory one. In fiscal and regulatory matters, for
example, the Court has adopted a permissive standard of review which
entertains a strong presumption of constitutionality and places the burden
of proof on the challenging parties.162 In such areas, some commentators
have argued:
... a permissive approach which does not require every classification to be
drawn with mathematical nicety seems a practical necessity if the process
of legislation is not to be hopelessly stymied. ... Only when the lack of
correspondence between classification [within the legislation] and [its
stated] purpose is gross or when the classification is otherwise
objectionable should courts intervene on equal protection grounds. 163
In areas involving civil rights or fundamental interests, courts have
constructed comprehensive analytical models of equal protection analysis
to attempt to avoid the criticism that they are usurping the power of the
legislature.
The decades of school litigation following the Brown decision, forcing
the desegregation of public schools, demonstrates vividly the concerns
which may arise where the courts adopt an activist stance. Critics of the
Court's holding in Brown charged that it had acted unconstitutionally and
that desegregation should have been left to the discretion of local elected
officials. 164 The reality of desegregation raised deep emotions in many
communities and required almost continual judicial pronouncements to
carry out the Court's order across the country. 165 The difficulty of
effecting mass institutional change by court order, and in the face of
community opposition, has been well documented.166 The Supreme
161. See Perry, "Modem Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal" (1979), 79
Colum. L. Rev. 1023 at 1027-28.
162. Tussman & Tenbrock, "Equal Protection of the Laws" (1948-49), 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341
at 368, n. 1.
163. Note, "Developments in the Law-Equal Protection" (1968), 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065 at
1083.
164. See" Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), in which local authorities in Little Rock,
Arkansas, openly challenged the constitutionality of the Court's holding in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also Bickel, supra, note 96.
165. See Bickle, id
166. See generally, Comment, "Legal Sanctions to Enforce Desegregation in the Public
Schools: The Contempt Power and the Civil Rights Acts" (1956), 65 Yale L.J. 630. See also
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Court has, seemingly, shied away from further pronouncements which
would entail substantial judicial interference into state affairs. In San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,167 the Court's
disinclination to involve itself in state affairs was evident in the majority
judgement:
This case represents far more than a challenge to the manner in which
Texas provides for the education of its children. We have here nothing less
than a direct attack on the way in which Texas has chosen to raise and
disburse state and local tax revenues. 68
Thus, arguments invoking the equal protection clause must be sensitive to
the reluctance of the courts to be seen as meddling in the jurisdiction of
local governments. Clearly, however, the final responsibility for enforcing
the Constitution rests with the courts. A constitutional right to equal
protection cannot for the sake of consistency bow to the exigencies of
federalism or finance. Constitutional litigation, therefore, "is a delicate
process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise ofjudgement by
those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the
process".
169
A functional model of the proper relationship between the judiciary
and the legislature must be responsive to the exalted status afforded to
constitutionally protected rights, and accept as given that the parameters
of such rights will be modified as a society progresses. The framework of
judicial analysis adopted, then, becomes of primary importance. Such a
framework must address both concerns over the proper role of the
judiciary in relation to elected authorities and concerns that the exercise
of judicial judgement in constitutional areas will be viewed as the
arbitrary imposition of personal values. The Rodrigue decision presents
a useful contrast of frameworks of equal protection analysis.
Traditional equal protection doctrine has spawned varying standards
of judicial review of state action. Where the state action threatens an
economic interest, the court will simply inquire as to whether the scheme
bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. On the other
hand, where the state action complained of threatens a suspect class or
fundamental interest, it will be subject to a strict standard of review
which requires that the state demonstrate that the scheme employed is
Iote, supra, note 163, at 1153. where it is observed that "Resistance to desegregation has
forced judges to become strategists in the battle for equality. Such a position takes them outside
traditional conceptions of the judicial role and imposes on them an essentially political task for
which they have no inherent competence."
167. San Antonio Independent SchoolDistrict v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
168. Id, at40.
169. Joint-AntiFascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) at 162.
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necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. The relationship between
the classifications of suspect classes and fundamental interests is
complex. 170
The design of the classification scheme - suspect class, fundamental
interest, and other interests in state action such as government services -
recognizes the responsibility of the judiciary to protect the constitutional
rights of the citizen, a responsibility which involves both protecting the
existence of such rights and ensuring the quality of their exercise.
Furthermore, the classification scheme itself, arguably, becomes illogical
in its design unless it is interpreted as protecting interests necessarily
incidental to the exercise of fundamental interests, even in the absence of
discrimination. The philosophical and practical bases of equal protection
doctrine are to protect the citizen against inequality of treatment at the
hands of government services. 171 It must be the existence of inequality in
areas subject to review under the equal protection clause rather than the
degree of inequality that should determine the standard of review to be
adopted. 72
(a) Equal Protection and Educational Finance
In Rodriguez,1 73 the majority in the United States Supreme Court held
that the Texas system of school finance could not be subject to a strict
standard of review because an education could not be classified as a
fundamental interest. Furthermore, the Court held, the individuals
adversely affected by the financing scheme could not be construed as a
suspect class within the accepted notions of such classification. The
system, therefore, "though concededly imperfect", did not violate the
equal protection clause because it assured a basic education for every
child and bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose - in
this case, local control of district schools.
170. "The interaction of these two factors can be visualized by imagining two gradients. Along
the first of these gradients is a hierarchy of classifications, with those that are most invidious
... at the top. Along the second, arranged in ascending order to importance, are interests such
as employment, education, and voting. When the classification drawn lies at the top of the first
gradient, it will be subject to strict review even when the interest it affects ranks low on the
second gradient... As the nature of the classification becomes less invidious ... the measure
will continue to elicit strict review only as it affects interests progressively more important..
(Note, supra note 163 at 1120-21).
171. See generally, Perry, supra note 161. DeTocqueville described equality as a providential
fact: "It has all the chief characteristics of such a fact: it is universial, it is lasting, it constantly
eludes all human interference, and all events as well as all men contribute to its progress".
Bradley, ed., Democracy in America 6 (1956).
172. Except, obviously, where one is dealing with a claim based on de minimis inequality
which results from the workings of an otherwise functional administrative structure.
173. San Antonio Independent SchoolDistrict v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Constitutional Protection of the Right to an Education
Although education had come to play a fundamental role within the
society, the majority stated, it could not benefit from the level of
protection afforded to fundamental interests. To so qualify, a right must
be implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.174 While the
majority was prepared to concede that "some identifiable quantum" of
education could fall under constitutional protection as necessary to the
exercise of other democratic rights, it declined to accept the "nexus
theory" as a basis for ensuring equality of educational opportunity.
How, for instance, is education to be distinguished from the significant
personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter? Empirical
examination might ... [demonstrate] that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and
ill-housed are among the most ineffective participants in the political
process ... 175
Suspect classifications in equal protection analysis must also possess
determinative characteristics which, the majority held, evaded the class of
plaintiffs under consideration.
Perhaps the best explanation for the emergence of the judicial
prohibition of suspect classification goes beyond the precept urged by
Dworkin, that every individual is entitled to "equal concern and
respect". 176 Perry formulates the basic notion of equal protection as
follows: "... although not every person is the moral equal of every other
person, there are some traits and factors - of which race is the
paradigmatic example - by virtue of which no person ought to be
deemed morally inferior to any other person." 177 Perry's formulation
seems buttressed by the language in Brown, which indicates that
segregation violated the Fourteenth Amendment because "[t]o separate
them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone."'78 Generally speaking, then, suspect classifications are those
which bear no reasonable relation to the stated legislative purpose.
The majority in Rodriguez stated that to qualify as a suspect
classification, the class of disadvantaged must be identified or "defined in
174. "[I)f the degree of judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated, depending on a
majority's view of the importance of the interest affected we would have gone far toward
making this court a 'super-legislature'. We would, indeed, then be assuming a legislative role
... for which the Court lacks both authority and competence". Id, at 31.
175. Id, at 37. Arguments supportive of the lower court's finding that education was a
fundamental interest, the majority held, were "unpersuasive".
176. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977) 266-78.
177. Perry, supra, note 163, at 1031.
178. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) at 494.
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customary equal protection terms"'179 and the nature of the deprivation
must be absolute. Rather than attempting to define those disadvantaged
as: (1) a class of "poor" persons as defined by a quantifiable standard
such as the poverty level, (2) those who are relatively poorer than others,
or (3) those who reside in relatively poorer school districts, 80 the
appellees adopted a theory of district discrimination, contending, in
essence, that the financing system would be discriminatory even if
relatively poor districts did not contain poor people.' 8' The majority
rejected this flexible classification holding that earlier case law 182
established that the class seeking protection must be determinate and
definable either as indigent or as comprised of persons whose income falls
below a designated level. The deprivation alleged by the appellees must
be absolute, the majority reasoned, because the equal protection clause
did not require "precisely equal advantages" and because the exact
relation between the quality of education received and the amount of
money disbursed could not be established. 183
The constitutionality of the finance scheme, the majority concluded,
fell to be determined by the lesser standard of review - did the scheme
bear a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose? In this regard, the
principles of federalism would have to be considered: "... it would be
difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our federal
system than the one now before us, in which we are urged to abrogate
systems of financing public education presently in existence in virtually
every state." 184 The appellant school authorities argued that the Texas
financing scheme was dedicated to the concept of local control of district
schools. The interplay of principles of federalism and the desire to ensure
local control of schools, considered in conjunction with the finding that
the State was providing a basic minimum education to every child,
established a rational relation to a legitimate'state purpose. Only in cases
involving the infringement of constitutional rights or civil liberties did the
State have to demonstrate that it had chosen the least restrictive
scheme. 85 The existence of some interdistrict inequality (as high as 50
179. San Antonio Independent SchoolDistrictv. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) at 19.
180. Id, at 19-20.
181. Id, at 51.
182. See: Griffen v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189
(1971); Gardnerv. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969).
183. San Antonio Independent SchoolDistrict v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) at 23.
184. Id, at 44.
185. The Court refused to apply the strict scrutiny test in both Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) at 264; and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) at 485, despite acknowledging
that welfare constituted a "basic economic need" for impoverished persons.
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per cent) was insufficient basis for striking down the entire scheme.
Powell J. stated:
It is also well to remember that even those districts that have reduced
ability to make free decisions with respect to how much they spend on
education still retain under the present system a large measure of authority
as to how available funds will be allocated. They ftuther enjoy the power
to make numerous other decisions with respect to the operation of the
schools.186
A minimum standard of review, then, can be satisfied by even a
tenuous relation between the articulated state purpose and the legislative
scheme. The State had not been required to demonstrate that it had
chosen a rational basis on which to maximize local control rather than a
scheme which resulted in "different treatment being accorded to persons
placed by statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly
unrelated to the objective of that statute".1 87
The method of analysis adopted by the majority is highly formalistic.
Once the interest is classified as fundamental or simply protected, it must
then be examined to determine whether the aggrieved class of litigants is
identifiable and a relationship between the state action and the alleged
harm established. The Court has rarely employed a similarly strict
method of analysis when dealing with essential government services. 88
Nevertheless, many commentators heralded this more rigorous approach
to equal protection analysis because it avoided charges of judicial
subjectivity in according to some interests the classification of
"fundamental" and thereby providing them more protection than
accorded other interests. 89 Indeed, evidence of the distrust of judicial
subjectivity is pervasive throughout the majority judgement.19 However,
there exists a second approach to equal protection analysis which relies
less heavily on strict classification schemes. An example of this approach
is found in the dissenting judgement of Marshall J. in Rodriguez.
While both Marshall J. and the majority agreed that education is of
vital importance to the individual, the former observed that the restrained
approach adopted by the majority".., can only be seen as a retreat from
186. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) at 51
(emphasis added).
187. See.Reedv.Reed, 404 U.S. 71(1971) at 75-76.
188. See eg., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Harper v. Virginia B, L of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
189. "By setting up a hierarchy of interests the Supreme Court leaves itself open to the charge
that it is usurping the legislative function and preventing a proper majoritarian choice of
values" (Note, supra, note 163 at 1132).
190. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) at 71 per
Marshall J., dissenting.
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our historic commitment to equality of educational opportunity and as
unsupportable acquiescence in a system which deprives children in their
earliest years of the chance to reach their full potential as citizens." 191
Inequality of education opportunity is the issue to be decided, and this
can be accomplished without the evidentiary burdens to establish a
relationship between state action and the alleged harm imposed by the
majority on the respondents.
We sit ... to enforce our Constitution. It is an inescapable fact that if one
district has more funds available per pupil than another.., the former will
have greater choice in educational planning.... I believe the question of
discrimination in educational quality must be deemed to be an objective
one that looks to what the State provides its children, not to what the
children are able to do with what they receive... [W]ho can ever measure
for such a child the opportunities lost ... for want of a broader, more
enriched education? Discrimination in the opportunity to learn that is
afforded a child must be our standard. 92
It is the existence of interdistrict inequality in per pupil expenditures,
rather than a question of adequacy of educational instruction, that
invokes the issue of a violation of equal protection.193
While the equal protection clause does not mandate "precisely equal
advantages", Mr. Justice Marshall was of the opinion that it does
mandate that "all persons simiarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike". 194 The fact that the State was providing an "adequate" education
to all children, therefore, was irrelevant to equal protection analysis: " ...
this Court has never suggested that because some 'adequate' level of
benefits is provided to all, discrimination in the provision of services is
therefore constitutionally excusable."' 95 Indeed, as he points out, the
judiciary would be hard-pressed to determine the standard at which an
individual's education would be "constitutionally sufficient". 196 "I find
any other approach to the issue", Mr. Justice Marshall states,
"unintelligible and without directing principle". 197
Rather than adopting a rigid approach to the classification of an
interest and accepting such classification as determinative of the standard
of review to be employed, the degree of judicial review applicable should
be seen as a spectrum of standards. Determinations as to the proper
191. Id
192. Id, at 83-84.
193. Id, at 90: "In my view, then, it is inequality - not some notion of gross inadequacy -
of educational opportunity that raises a question of denial of equal protection of laws."
194. Id, at 89. See also, F S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 235 U.S. 412 (1920) at 415.
195. Id
196. Id
197. Id, at 90.
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standard of review to be employed should be made after consideration of
"the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely
affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the
particular classification is drawn". 198 A fluid classification system would
allow the Court to address the major issue - to what extent is a
constitutionally recognized right dependent on an interest not mentioned
in the Constitution? Thus, the determination of which interests are
fundamental would remain based in the text of the Constitution.199 Once
the nature of the interest has been established, and it is determined that
the nature of the harm threatened is not de minimis, then the availability
of relief under the equal protection clause should not be further restrained
by requiring that the aggrieved class be definite. A definable class is not
a logical prerequisite element to equal protection analysis. Rather, it is the
basis of the discrimination that must be clearly identified.20° The
discrimination in Rodriguez, in Mr. Justice Marshall's view, was among
all school-age children on the basis of taxable property values in their
district. Quoting the District Court judgment, he asserted, "The quality of
public education may not be a function of wealth, other than the wealth
of the state as a whole".2'
Education must be recognized as a fundamental interest because of its
close relation to the political process and its role in "opening up to the
individual the central experiences of our culture".202 The issue is not
whether the appellees were entitled to the "most effective speech or the
most informed vote", but rather the discrimination which affects the
quality of education provided to schoolchildren within the state.
203
Because the existence of taxable property within a district bears no
relation to the quality of education to be provided, the state classification
on the basis of taxable property values deserves stricter scrutiny than a
test of rationality. The degree of discrimination effected by the legislative
198. Id, at 99.
199. "As the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the non-constitutional
interest draws closer, the non-constitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the degree
of judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must be
adjusted accordingly.... Only if we closely protect the related interest ... do we ultimately
ensure the integrity of the constitutional guarantee itself" (id, at 102-03).
200. "So long as the basis of the discrimination is clearly identified, it is possible to test it
against the State's purpose for such discrimination - whatever the standard of equal
protection analysis employed" (i, at 93). See also, Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972)
(primary filing fees for candidates held unconstitutional even though the disadvantaged class
could not be identified).
201. 337 F. Supp. 280 (1972) at 284.
202. Note, supra, note 163, at 1129.
203. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) at 116.
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scheme is irrelevant.204 On the basis of the facts presented, Mr. Justice
Marshall concluded:
... any substantial degree of scrutiny of the operation of the Texas
financing scheme reveals that the State has selected means wholly
inappropriate to secure its purported interests in assuring its school districts
local fiscal control 05
Thus, the financing scheme would be unconstitutional as a violation of
the equal protection clause. Given the threatened infringement would
create more than a de minimis harm, the applicable standard of review is
determined by assessing the fundamentality of the interest and the
invidious nature of the classification imposed by the state. Although such
a fluid analytical model is open to attack as arbitrary and political, any
application of equal protection principles to the area of the provision of
government services will be their nature involve subjective value
judgements. Indeed the more stringent analytical model adopted by the
majority can also be criticized as political.206 A more useful inquiry,
however, is to attempt to determine which model is best suited to the
educational setting.
(b) "Equal Access" or "Equal Outcome"
Equal protection principles are most relevant as a means of ensuring that
each student receives a "good quality" or "appropriate" education. As
Yudof points out, equal educational opportunity may adopt a number of
different models: equal access, equal treatment of races, and equal
outcomes.207 Equal access and equal treatment deal with the distribution
of educational resources and programs. The third model, equal outcomes,
would examine the effectiveness of the schooling process and attempt to
secure a basic minimum level of knowledge for every child.208 Courts,
Yudof argues, should limit themselves to equal access and racial
discrimination issues.
209
While the judiciary can bring about some adjustment in the distribution of
education resources and services and help redress racial discrimination, it
should not adjudicate rights in terms of schooling outcomes. Because of
the functional limitations of courts in considering matters of broad social
policy ... [and] the vulnerability of the relevant social science data, the
204. Id, at 118. See also: Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) at 668.
205. Id, at 129.
206. See Note, supra, note 163; and Yudof, "Equal Educational Opportunity" (1973), 51
Texas L. Rev. 411.
207. Yudof, id, at 412.
208. Note, "Unseparate But Unequal" (1966), 13 U.C.L.A. Law Rev. 1147 at 1168.
209. Yudof, supra, note 206 at 413.
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concept of equal educational opportunity defined as equal educational
achievement is an inappropriate basis for judicial intervention.210
A legal model of equal educational opportunity will serve as a basis of
judicial intervention and must acknowledge that courts are "institution-
ally incapable" of adopting a legislative role in areas of complex social
policy3" The courts should be reluctant to substitute their opinion for
that of elected officials except where the aggrieved class is under-
represented in the political process. Doctrinal and practical considera-
tions over the fundamentality of an individual's interest in an education,
Yudolf argues, must be circumscribed by the limits of judicial
manageability and the dictates of public policy.212
It is important to note that the equal access and equal outcome models
within the educational setting cannot be considered in isolation from each
other. Protection of the individual's interest in receiving an appropriate
education would require an equal protection structure which
incorporates regulation of educational inputs - money, extra-curricular
activities and physical facilities - with the opportunity for review of
administrative decisions which may exacerbate existing inequalities.
Consequently, it is pertinent to consider the relationship between the
equal access and equal outcome models. In contrast to Yudofs position
that the fundamentality of an individual's interest in an education must
bow to the limits of judicial manageability, it may be argued that the
limits of judicial manageability can be adequately broadened so as to
protect an individual's interest in an education.
The majority in Rodriguez adopts a narrow construction of equal access
requirements within the educational setting:
... the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or
precisely equal advantages ... in view of the infinite variables affecting
the educational process ... [No system can] assure equal quality of
education except in the most relative sense ... By providing 12 years of
free public school education, and by assuring teachers, books,
transportation, and operating funds... it now assures every child in every
school district an adequate education.
213
This construct contains no comparison of the quality of schooling
between districts to determine whether they are even relatively
210. Id
211. Id
212. Id, at 503. Other commentators who also focus on the proper nature of the judicial role
in education as non-interventionist include Kirp, "The Poor, The Schools, and Equal
Protection" (1968) 38 Harv. Educ. Rev. 635; Kurland, "Equal Educational Opportunity: The
Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined" (1968), 35 U. Chic. L Rev. 583.
213. San Antonio Independent SchoolDistrict v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) at 24.
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comparable; it focuses on a minimum adequate level of educational
opportunity. The majority argued that, without a relationship being
established between the level of district expenditure and the quality of
education afforded, any interdistrict comparison on the basis of wealth
would be inconclusive.
On the other hand, Mr. Justice Marshall, in dissent, flatly rejected the
assertion that there must be an established relationship between
educational expenditure and educational achievement before equal
protection analysis may be invoked.214 The purpose of the equal
protection clause, in his view, is to address arbitrary and unjustifiable
inequalities of state action - not to ensure minimal sufficiency in the
manner suggested by the majority. It "mandates nothing less than that 'all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike'. 215 The courts,
then, must examine objectively the amount of resources the state provides
to each district rather than attempt to determine what the children will be
able to do with the resources they receive.216 Thus, the minority judgment
seems to establish that equal access principles, when applied within the
educational setting, require equal, or relatively equal, per pupil
expenditure interdistrict. An appraisal of educational inputs allows the
courts to protect an individual's interest in receiving an appropriate
education in the absence of concrete evidence establishing the proper
relationship between expenditure levels and educational achievement.
A judicially mandated financing formula requiring equal or "relatively
equal" per pupil expenditure interdistrict, some commentators argue, is a
species of judicial activism which cannot be supported by the terms of the
Constitution.217 In many areas, the school financing system is not guilty
of any systematic discrimination against the poor: "There are simply
some poor people, possibly a very small number, who bear the brunt of
a system which is otherwise distributing resources in a constitutionally
acceptable manner. The propriety of reshaping an entire educational
structure on this basis is questionable.218 Rationalization of judicial
involvement in educational policy areas must go beyond traditional
discrimination analyses. Arguments that education is a fundamental
214. Marshall J. states: "In fact, if financing variations are so insignificant to educational
quality, it is difficult to understand why a number of our country's wealthiest school districts,
which have no legal obligations to argue in support of ... the Texas legislation, have
nonetheless zealously pursued its cause before this Court" (id, at 85).
215. Id, at 89 citing E S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920) at 415.
216. "Discrimination in the opportunity to learn that is afforded a child must be our standard"
(id, at 84).
217. See generally, Yudof, supra, note 206.
218. Id, at 490. This is precisely what the state courts who have invalidated financing schemes
have successfully undertaken. See, eg., Serrano v. Pres4 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971).
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interest can be constructed but "seem hollow when interests such as
housing and welfare have been held not to be constitutionally
fundamental".21 9 Furthermore, without additional empirical evidence on
the education production function - or the effect of education on the
individual's later opportunities in life - arguments that education should
be treated differently than other governmental services on the basis of its
instrumental effects are unpersuasive.
The case for treating education differently from other services must finally
rest on the special characteristics of the immediate beneficiaries - the
children. Children, in a sense, are less blameworthy and less responsible
for their circumstances, and, in turn, they are less able to alter them. 220
However, it is not necessary to invoke emotional concepts of innocence
and youth to construct a workable legal framework for the protection of
the individual's interest in receiving an appropriate education.
Under an equal outcome model, wide disparities in per pupil
expenditure would be allowed in disadvantaged areas for such programs
as compensatory education projects (such as "Head Start"). The main
objective of the educational system should be to satisfy the needs of all
children in a manner that results in equality in the effects of the schooling
process.221
The model assumes that the capacity to learn is randomly distributed
between races and socio-economic groups, and cites the non-random
distribution of success and failure in public school as proof that poor and
minority group children are not performing to their full capacities. 2m
A major downfall of the equal outcome model, Yudolf argues, is that it
is designed to eliminate discrimination rather than to protect the
individual's right to a good quality education. Furthermore, the model
imposes high achievement in test scores as the single, appropriate
measure of educational success.
2
23
The formulation that every child has a right to develop to his or her full
potential is currently embodied in some state and provincial educational
statutes.2 4 To ensure comprehensive legal protection of a right to an
219. Yudof, supra, note 206 at 490.
220. Id, at 492.
221. Id, at 419.
222. Id, at 421.
223. Clearly there are a number of other, equally valid educational objectives besides
imparting substantive knowledge capable of measurement through formal testing procedures.
A standard that evaluated the right to education on the basis of test scores may be required,
however, since the level of educational achievement will affect the exercise of other
constitutional rights, such as voting (see generally authorities cited at notes 34-35, supra) and
the individual's interest in career and higher educational opportunities.
224. See, eg., Illinois Constitution, supra, note 14.
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education, some form of judicial review of the effects of the schooling
process must be maintained. Nevertheless, it is argued that, because social
science research is unable to pinpoint conclusively the factors which
contribute to educational achievement, it is inappropriate for courts to
attempt to intervene in the schooling process and establish performance
goals for educators or students."M
Many of the criticisms levelled at the equal outcome model fail to
envision its primary function within a legal analytical scheme to protect
an individual's right to an education. Even assuming the adoption by the
judiciary of an equal access model which required uniform per pupil
expenditure within the jurisdiction, a student's right to an education
would continue to be threatened if such funds were improperly utilized.
Proponents of the equal outcome model, Yudof states, are often forced to
rely on "outrageously blatant denials of educational opportunity", such as
occurred in Lau v. Nichols"26 in which the court forced a California
School district to offer remedial English classes to non-native students, to
justify court intervention without definitive findings as to the effect of the
remedial measures sought. It can be argued that the proposition that
remedial courses should be offered to non-native students is no more than
a specific application of the more general principle that the educational
system should attempt to identify and eliminate all non-cognitive barriers
to a student's potential education achievement."27
Opponents of the equal outcome model point to the dearth of research
available on the relationship between non-school factors - socio-
economic, cultural, and family influences - and educational
achievement as a major justification for their views that the courts should
decline any role in imposing outcome requirements.228 The absence of
concrete data, the perils of judicial intervention into social policy, and the
difficulties of enforcing a broadly interventionist equal outcome model
make it an inappropriate model for judicial intervention. However, in
addition to extreme examples of denials of educational opportunity (such
225. "Courts simply cannot formulate any simple standard that would ensure improvement in
the schooling outcomes of the disadvantaged.., even assuming that a standard could be
formulated, the massive difficulties inherent in judicial attempts to manipulate educational
resources and policies would make enforcing such a broad equal protection decision nearly
impossible" (Yudof, supra, note 206 at 430).
226. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1973).
227. Dewey, supra, note 5.
228. "[I]t is far from clear that schools modify in any way the effect of socio-economic,
cultural, and family influences on achievement... [One study found] that after controlling for
six student socio-economic background factors, differences in resources and policies between
schools accounted for less than one per cent of the average pupil achievement differences"
(Yudof, supra, note 206 at 422-23).
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as that which occurred in the Lau decision) it is possible to enumerate
other fact situations which also constitute a denial of equal opportunity
and require judicial review. There are a number of factors which
experience has demonstrated are irrelevant to educational achievement
and should not be considered either in the allocation of educational
resources or in the design of educational programs: race, socio-economic
status, and family background are perhaps the most obvious of such
classifications. Tracking, unequal distribution of advanced or college
preparatory programs, and even blatantly unequal extra-curricular
programs which are based on such characteristics, could all be subject to
judicial review.229
However, problems such as tracking and the proper distributions of
college preparatory programs could only be cured by an equal access
model which goes well beyond Mr. Justice Marshall's liberal
interpretation of equal per pupil expenditure. School authorities would
remain free, for example, to decide that more technical/vocational
programs are better suited for minority students to ensure that they secure
employment in a shrinking job market. Such decisions are not, strictly
speaking, educational policy decisions and yet have a profound effect on
the structure and quality of education an individual will receive. Even in
the absence of a discriminatory motive, the decision to implement more
technical/vocational programs in disadvantaged or minority areas is one
which substantially affects an individual's interest in an education. The
burden should rest on the educational authorities to demonstrate that
such policies further a substantial state interest. Judicial examination of
issues like program allotment must come from an educational-outcome
analysis. An analytical model oriented strictly towards equal protection
principles, however, leaves the individual without substantive protection
of his right to an education where there is no substantial resource or racial
discrimination apparent in the standard established by the educational
authorities.230
229. See, eg., Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967) in which tracking was
found unconstitutional. Children were tested early in their school careers and the lack of
compensatory education prevented children from moving from one stream to another (for
example, from vocational track to college preparatory track).
230. "[I~f the denial of access is not total, if it involves no suspect classification, and if school
authorities present substantial reasons for their actions, the Courts should not intervene to alter
the allocation of services. . . . The standards for decision are every bit as vague and
indeterminable as under the equal outcomes theory of equal educational opportunity;... The
need to draw minute qualitative decisions would force the courts into the awkward task of
determining who needs what... [T]hat process would lead full circle to some form of outcome
determination" (Yudof, supra, note 206 at 476).
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If viewed as an analytical model which simply allows judicial review
of seemingly neutral and benign educational policies which, in fact, may
prevent individuals from attaining their full potential as citizens, the
equal-outcomes theory of equal educational opportunity becomes a
necessary third leg in a flexible legal structure designed to protect the
individual's right to an education, namely, procedural review, removal of
access barriers and then enforcement of substantive parity of opportunity.
"A state denies equal protection whenever it fails to give it. Denying
includes inaction as well as action."231 The right to an education
necessarily involves a more active stance of judicial review because the
quality of educational opportunity received is determinative of the
existence of the right itself2 32
A combined equal-access/equal-outcomes structure which mandated
equal or relatively equal per pupil expenditure - which can be defined
as prohibiting all resource discrimination that lacks substantial
justification - would protect the individual from an inferior educational
experience. The early equal-protection decisions prohibiting discrimina-
tion against blacks constitutionalized the principle of the moral
irrelevance of race. The extension of equal-protection principles to other
areas of social policy may also be based on the proposition that:
.. it is legitimate for the Court to constitutionalize the principle of the
moral irrelevance of other traits indicating nothing about the moral worth
or desert of a person.... Of course, this more general equal protection
principle - that government may not attach negative significance to traits
indicating nothing about a person's moral status - does not itself indicate
which traits are morally relevant and which are not.
2 33
To determine the constitutionality of any classification, then, it is
necessary to examine whether the classification should be accepted as
representing a morally relevant trait. If the classification does not
represent a morally relevant criterion - indicating something about the
moral worth or desert of the individual - there is no justification for an
unequal distribution of government services on the basis of the
classification imposed.
Resource discrimination in educational financing schemes is a clear
example of a violation of the equal protection principle on a morally
irrelevant classification. In Serrano v. Priest the court stated:
231. Frank & Munro, supra, note 159 at 164, quoting Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong. 1st Sess. 501
(1871).
232. In Green v. County School Board 391 U.S. 430 (1968), for example, the Court imposed
a positive duty on the Board to rectify past segregationist policies. A freedom-of-choice plan,
therefore, was held unacceptable when more effective remedies were available.
233. Perry, supra, note 161 at 1051.
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To allot more educational dollars to the children of one district than to
those of another merely because of the fortuitous presence of... [taxable]
property is to make the quality of a child's education dependent upon the
location of private commercial and industrial establishments. Surely this is
to rely on the most irrelevant of factors as the basis for educational
financing.2
4
Within the context of the judgement the court's statements go beyond a
mere call for rationality in policy making. It establishes that educational
financing schemes based on taxable wealth within a district are founded
on a classification which is morally irrelevant to the quality of
educational opportunity that a state offers its children - property-based
financing schemes brand children in property-poor districts as inferior.235
They infringe upon the individual's right to an appropriate education in
the same manner as racially segregated schools often represented blatant
inequalities in educational opportunity. The injury suffered by children in
property-poor districts is the resource discrimination itself.
Generally, it is unnecessary to prove injury once discrimination has
been established in traditional discrimination analyses under the equal
protection clause.236 If an "ultimate injury" suffered by children affected
by inequitable financing schemes could be established, it would provide
additional impetus for judicial intervention. But it has been claimed that
it "is virtually impossible to determine the long-term impact that absolute
or relative denial will have on a person's life."237 However, when dealing
with questions of educational opportunity, it is misleading to argue in
terms of relative denial. The quality of the education afforded, once
again, is determinative of the existence of the right to an education:
educational services can be distinguished from other government services
on this basis. By permitting inequalities in interdistrict financing a state is,
in fact, denying children in property-poor districts the right to an
education - even as they are provided 12 years free tuition and books.
That a child forced to attend an underfunded school with poor physical
facilities, less experienced teachers, larger classes, and a narrower range of
courses than a school with substantially more funds - and thus greater
234. Serrano v. Pries4 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971) at 1252-53 (emphasis added).
235. Like segregation on the basis of racial origin, property-based financing schemes force
poor children to begin their school careers at a disadvantage. As the U.S. Supreme Court held
in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) at 492, we must look to the effect of
unequal expenditures on public education. To separate poor children in inferior schools
"generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone" (at 494).
236. Hargravev.Kirk, 313 F. Supp 944 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
237. Yudof, supra, note 206 at 484.
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choice in educational planning - may nevertheless excel is to the credit
of the child, not the State...238
Thus in terms of educational opportunity, relative denial can reasonably
be equated with absolute denial. Unless an individual has received an
appropriate education he will be barred from pursuing the higher
education or career opportunities open to othersm 39 Denial of educational
opportunity, therefore, must be seen as an injury in a rapidly advancing
and highly technological society.240
Equal protection principles offer a flexible analytical framework for
judicial intervention to protect the individual's right to an education
notwithstanding the majority judgement in Rodriguez. A framework of
equal-protection analysis based on an equal-access/equal-outcome
structure would justify judicial intervention into resource discrimination
in education. It also would allow courts to address, in a fluid and
cohesive manner, the central issue in educational litigation: how much
constitutional protection should be afforded to the individual's interest in
an education. There is little need for concern that courts would soon
become involved in attempting to review day-to-day educational policy
decisions. The nature of the right to an education under the equal
protection doctrine may be defined as equal access to educational
resources and equal opportunity in program allotment. Educational
outcomes are relevant primarily as a means for the judiciary to determine
whether superficially neutral policy decisions, in effect, are perpetuating
low achievement patterns among children from property-poor districts.
3. Equal Protection and Equal Benefit" The Canadian Views
Canadian equal protection principles may be developed along similar
lines of argument to protect the individual's right to an appropriate
education. In all Canadian jurisdictions, education is funded primarily by
the state on a basic per pupil rate.241 There remains, nonetheless, instances
where resource allocation or program allotment should be subject to
judicial scrutiny to ensure that the individual's right to an appropriate
238. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) at 84 per
Marshall J., dissenting.
239. See, eg., Marshall's J. comments on the difficulty of establishing minimum quantum of
education which would be constitutionally protected (id, at 89). See also Michelman,
"Foreword. On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment" (1969), 83 Harv.
L. Rev. 7.
240. The fallacy of "relative" equal educational opportunity is perhaps best exposed by
illiteracy statistics. See infra, note 242.
241. For a brief, general discussion on educational finance, see MacKay, Education Law in
Canada 27-8,44-5,247 (1984).
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education is not threatened. Low achievement rates in inner-city schools
and among minority communities may be indicative of state policies
which deprive such students of their right to an appropriate education.
242
The Canadian analysis will begin with a review of the equal protection
doctrine under the Canadian Bill of Rights, 243 followed by an
examination of section 15(1) of the Charter.
(a) The Pre-Charter Era
The Canadian Bill of Rights, in section l(b) recognizes "the right of the
individual to equality before the law and the protection of the law".
Judicial interpretation of equal protection doctrine under the Bill of
Rights was based upon the common law concept of the rule of law.
Dicey defined the rule of law as follows:
... Equality before the law, or the equal subjection of all classes to the
ordinary law of the land, administered by the ordinary law courts; the
"rule of law" in this sense excludes the idea of any exemption of officials
or others from the duty of obedience to the law which governs other
citizens or from the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals .... 244
The burden of interpreting equal-opportunity doctrine under formalistic
conception of the rule of law resulted in a line of tortured and
contradictory judicial decisions.
Pre-Charter equal opportunity decisions limited the scope of the
doctrine to largely procedural questions. Individuals were equal before
the law if a law validly enacted by the legislature to apply to only one
class of citizens was applied equally among all members within the
designated class.245 There appeared to be one limited exception to this
very restrictive view of the operation of section 1(6) of the Bill of Rights.
In R. v. Drybones,246 a decision of the Canadian Supreme Court
invalidating a conviction under section 94(a) of the Indian Act which
made it unlawful for an Indian to be intoxicated off an Indian reserve,
Mr.Justice Ritchie stated that in regard to classifications based on race
242. The results of Winnipeg inner-city students on the Canadian Test of Basic Skills may be
cited as an example: "... all 28 of its inner city schools scored well below (the national
average). . . - only one in 100 schools in any given jurisdiction should do that badly... two
schools landed at the bottom first percentile in all categories, which is like not taking the test
at all" (Nikifourk, "Why Our Teachers Can't Teach", Quest Magazine, September, 1984, 35
at39).
243. Canadian Bill ofRights, S.C. 1960, c. 44 (R.S.C. 1970, Appendix Ill).
244. Dicey, Introducton to the Law of the Constitution 202-03 (Wade, ed., 10th ed., 1961).
245. The leading equal protection cases are: A.G. Canada v. Lavel [1974] S.C.R. 1349; A.G.
Canada v. Canard (1975), 52 D.L.R. (3d) 548 (S.C.C.); Bliss v. A.G. Canada (1978), 92
D.L.R. (3d) 417 (S.C.C.).
246. R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282.
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the equal protection provision of the Bill of Rights meant at the very
minimum:
... that no individual or group of individuals is to be treated more harshly
than another under the law ... An individual is denied equality before the
law if it is made an offence punishable at law, on account of his race, for
him to do something which his fellow Canadians axe free to do without
having committed any offence...247
However, the Supreme Court was reluctant to extend the ambit of the
classifications which would be invalid under equal protection principles
beyond racial classifications which affected the administration of
justice.2 48 The Court rejected the "egalitarian concept exemplified by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution", adopting instead
Dicey's definition of equal protection as "equal subjugation df all classes
to the ordinary law of the land administered by the ordinary courts".249
The formal equality principle was to be invoked in a series of decisions
which focused on the question of whether the law was validly enacted
rather than whether it contravened equal protection principles.2 15 Perhaps
the low point of this era was reached in Bliss v: A. G. Canada,251 in
which signs of severe strain in the formal equality-principle reasoning
became evident. Section 46 of the Unemployment Insurance Ac4 which
required pregnant women to have worked longer than other persons,
including non-pregnant women, in order to qualify for benefits, was held
not to contravene equal opportunity principles.
Section 46 applies to pregnant women, it has no application to women
who are not pregnant, and it has no application, of course, to men. If s. 46
treats unemployed pregnant women differently from other unemployed
persons, be they male or female, it is, it seems to me, because they are
pregnant and not because they are women.~
25
In'Bliss, Drybones was distinguished on the basis that- the latter case
involved "the imposition of a penalty on a racial group to which other
citizens are not subjected", while the former involved "a definition of the
qualifications required for entitlement to benefits",353 Thus, the major
issue in equal opportunity litigation became whether the scheme in
question was "justifiable" as promoting a "valid federal objective".
247. Id, at 297.
248. A.G. for Canada v. Lavel4 [19741 S.C.R. 1349.
249. Id, at 1365-66.
250. See, eg., A.G. Canada v. Canard (1975), 52 D.L.R. 3d 548. The Court felt that if it
invalidated ss. 42-44 of the Indian Act its judgement would render the entire Act inoperative.
251. Blissv.A.G. Canada (1978), 77 D.L.R. (3d) 609 (EC.A.).
252. Id, at 613 per Pratte J.
253. A.G. Canada v. Bliss (1978), 92 D.L.R. (3d) 417 at 423 (S.C.C.).
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The valid federal objective test has been applied consistently in equal
opportunity litigation and most recently in Mackay v. The Queen.254 For
the majority in Mackay, the valid federal objective test was fulfilled if it
was shown that the legislation in question "was enacted by Parliament
constitutionally competent to do so and exercising it powers in
accordance with the tenets of responsible government". 255 Thus
conceived, the equal opportunity doctrine became:
... nothing more than a demand for rationality - a demand that
statements made about one person be generalizable into statements about
all similar persons in similar circumstances.... It becomes necessary, then,
in order to apply the formal equality principle, to determine in what
respects men are similar and to decide which of these are relevant to the
kind of treatment they should receive.256
(b) The Charter Era
The equal protection provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is
to be found in section 15(1):
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and,
in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic
origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability.
The wording of this provision differs substantially from that found in
section l(a) of the Bill of Rights and provides the courts with the
opportunity to start afresh in dealing with issues of equal protection and
opportunity. There is no need for the reasoning employed in pre-Charter
era equal protection cases to be utilized in the post-Charter period.257
However, before turning to an examination of the application of the
equal protection principle in section 15(1) of the Charter to the field of
education, it is necessary to digress for a moment to consider a relevant
and important issue, that of group versus individual rights under the
Charter.
Tamopolsky draws a distinction between group rights and individual
rights:
... an assertion of a human right emphasizes the proposition that everyone
is to be treated the same regardless of his or her membership in a particular
identifiable group. The assertion of group rights, on the other hand, bases
254. Mackay v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 370.
255. Id, at 393.
256. Note, supra, note 163 at 1164.
257. Some of the factors which support a new beginning are provided in Hogg, Constitutional
Law of Canada 650-51 (2nd ed., 1985).
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itself upon a claim of an individual or a group of individuals because of
membership in an identifiable group.2s5
This "basic distinction", it is argued, leads to constraints on the
availability of remedies to redress violation of group rights.
The question that arises is whether a constitutional guarantee of rights
could be at all effective if it requires positive governmental action for its
realization... How does one enforce the economic, social and cultural
rights which require the state to provide something? ... In considering
group rights such as those of language, culture and education, it is
necessary to recognize the limitations upon constitutional guaranteesa 59
Thus, the individual/group rights dichotomy is perceived to be fraught
with classification difficulties and seems to negate the foundation of equal
protection and equal benefit principles by insulating government action
in a number of areas from judicial review.
However, the dichotomy, arguably, is antithetical to the broadly
phrased remedial powers bestowed upon the judiciary by section 24 of
the Charter. In the educational setting, for example, it may be argued that
equal protection principles require government to provide equal services
to minority groups. It should be noted, however, that an individual
within a minority could claim the same relief for provision of equal
services regardless of his membership within the minority group. A black
parent from a disadvantaged area, for example, could claim that his
children were being denied equal educational opportunity and that
"blacks" were, by virtue of section 15, entitled to such opportunity.
Everyone, regardless of his membership in a particular group, is entitled
to equal protection and equal benefit.260 To argue that the judiciary
should recognize "limitations on constitutional guarantees" where the
government must take positive action to protect the right in tautological.
Again, using the educational setting as an example, it may be asked: Is
forcing educational authorities to ensure relative equality of educational
inputs requiring that such authorities take a "positive action" - or is the
judiciary invalidating a legislated structure which results in unequality of
opportunity?
The individual/group rights dichotomy is neither a necessary nor a
logical component in a theory of the construction of remedies under
258. Tamopolsky, "The Equality Rights", in Tarnopolsky & Beaudoin, eds., The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedonms 437 (1982).
259. Id, at 438-39.
260. There is no requirement in Canadian constitutional law that the disadvantaged be a
"class" or "determinable". Cf San Antonio Independent SchoolDistict v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1 (1973) (majority judgement).
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section 24 of the Charter. Sections 24(1) of the Charter and 52(1) of the
Constitution Act must be interpreted in conjunction. Section 24(1) states:
Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have
been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to
obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the
circumstances.
Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act also is applicable to the provisions
of the Charter:
The constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law
that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent
of the inconsistency, of no force of effect.
The provisions of section 52(1) become relevant in determining the
proper scope of the remedial powers granted to the judiciary under
section 24(1).261
Initially, the remedial framework established by the construction of
section 24(1) must be clarified. Coupled with the pre-Charter case law on
standing,262 the section clearly gives every individual the right to allege a
violation of his constitutional rights so long as he in some way is
personally affected by the government action. The requirement that the
action be brought in a court of "competent jurisdiction" could be
interpreted as forcing the victim to bring an action in the tribunal
competent to award the type of remedy sought.263 It is more practical and
in keeping with the history of the section, however, to interpret the
reference to "court of competent jurisdiction" as referring to jurisdiction
over subject matter and litigants. All courts, then, would possess
discretionary competence in the application of remedies to litigious issues
falling within their jurisdiction subject to the "just and appropriate"
standard set out in the section.264 Furthermore, there is nothing in the
language of section 24(1) which compels the courts only to have recourse
to remedies currently in use in constitutional litigation. But
[e]ven if section 24(1) were construed to restrict each court to its normal
remedial powers, many opportunities for innovation would remain,
because most courts have a variety of flexible remedial tools at their
disposal ... [and] ... recent developments ... demonstrate the courts'
continuing ability to tailor equitable remedies to suit new situations.2 65
261. For an innovative and comprehensive treatment of remedies under the Charter, see
Gibson, "Enforcement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms", in Tarnopolsky &
Beaudoin, eds., The Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms 489 (1982).
262. Thorson v. A.G. Canada, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138; Nova Scotia Bd of Censors v. McNeil
[1976] 2 S.C.R. 265; Mi. of Justice (Can.) v. Borowsk, [1982] 1 W.W.R. 97.
263. Gibson, supra note 261 at 50.
264. Id
265. Id, at 504-05.
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In judicial review of educational disputes, mandatory and prohibitory
injunctions may prove to be the remedies best suited to the task of
maintaining equal opportunity to an appropriate education.266 The
appeal of the injunction as a remedy in the educational setting is its
flexibility. A court may order, for example, that a school district desist in
a discriminatory pattern of program allotment 'without imposing specific
allotment requirements. The reorganization process which would follow
a judgment establishing a violation of equal opportunity principles would
involve all interested parties: the litigants, other volunteer or educational
support groups, and the educational authorities.267 The court's function,
then, would be to sanction the resulting agreement as in keeping with
constitutional principles; it would not be the function of the court to
become involved in educational policy decisions. Indeed, with the
entrenchment of the Charter, courts may prove more amenable to
fashioning innovative remedies to protect constitutional rights:
... as an Australian authority on equitable remedies points out, it is a
question of degree: as the importance of injunctive relief increases in
particular situations, the reluctance of the courts to undertake supervisory
responsibility decreases. Few legal matters are as important as compliance
by governmental authorities with constitutionally entrenched
safeguards. 268
The right of equal opportunity to an appropriate education has a number
of complex components. In addition to the traditional concept of review
of the process by which educational policy decisions are taken, it is
necessary to be able to review the interplay of objective variables (such
as resource allotment), on the more subjective variables, such as student
achievement patterns interdistrict, which act as indicies of the level of
educational opportunity being offered to the individual. Low
achievement patterns in districts are often indicative of a lower level of
educational opportunity, either through less motivated teachers, larger
266. Mandatory and prohibitory injunctions have been employed extensively by the judiciary
in the United States in implementing school desegregation orders. However, the use of
injunctions in civil rights litigation has presented a number of difficulties. Many litigants have
been forced to continually reapply to the courts for injunctive relief in the face of non-
compliant public authorities. See, eg., the judgement of Chief Justice Burger in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). Over the years since Brown,
many difficulties were encountered in implementation of the basic constitutional requirement
that the State not discriminate between public school children on the basis of their race.
Deliberate resistance of some to the Court's mandates has impeded the good-faith efforts of
others to bring school systems into compliance.
267. The list of participants imposed is an attempt to be faithful to Tribe's structural due
process theory (Tribe, supra, note 62).
268. Gibson, supra, note 261 at 506.
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class sizes, less educational leadership by the principal, or any of the other
factors identified as having an impact on student achievement patterns.269
Injunctive relief is particularly suited to the educational setting. It can
be used to invalidate both procedural inequities that may put racial or
cultural minorities at a disadvantage in the formulation of educational
policy, and substantive inequities, facially neutral policies which
perpetuate low student achievement. It is necessary, however, to
approach the analysis of equal educational opportunity issues from a
bistructured input/outcome model. Clearly, even without concrete
evidence linking expenditure levels to educational achievement, equal
educational opportunity must incorporate a standard which permits
resource discrimination only where there exists substantial justification.
Educational policies must also be evaluated with reference to their
outcomes.
(c) Equal Protection: A Constitutional Guarantee
Pre-Charter equal opportunity doctrine had expanded from the concept
of purely formal equality only to an acceptance of race as an invidious
classification which could invalidate a validly enacted legislative
scheme270 where the scheme imposed a penalty but not where it
conferred a benefit.271 This distinction is difficult to support on the basis
of rational argument. Surely once the discriminatory effect of a
classification is demonstrated, the issue must become whether the
discrimination perpetrated is "justifiable" rather than whether the form of
discrimination is acceptable. As a constitutional construct, therefore, the
equal opportunity provisions of the Charter must expand to encompass
a growing range of government services and benefits.
The function of equal opportunity principles, in general, is to ensure
fair and open competition within the society. As Rawls suggests, "each
person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty
compatible with a similar liberty for others". 272 Frank Scott defined
equality before the law as "two basic rules underlying our constitutional
structure ... ":
The first is that the individual may do anything he pleases... unless there
is some provision of law prohibiting him. Freedom is thus presumed and
is the general rule. All restrictions are exceptions... [The second is that
269. For a discussion of effective school research, see Ratner, "A New Legal Duty for Urban
Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills" (1985), 63 Texas L. Rev. 776.
270. R. v.Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282.
271. See Tarnopolsky, supra note 258.
272. Rawls, supra, note 43 at 60.
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a] public officer can do nothing in his public capacity unless the law
permits it. His incapacity is presumed and authority to act is an
exception.273
As a constitutional principle, equality before the law is designed to
protect the citizen from arbitrary action by government which is against
his interest, not to protect government actions from judicial review. To
draw a distinction between legislation inflicting a penalty and legislation
conferring a benefit in equal opportunity analysis is misleading; it diverts
attention away from the central issue: Has the government overstepped
its authority by conferring a benefit or imposing a penalty on a class of
individuals on the basis of a classification which is not constitutionally
acceptable? Furthermore, where legislation sets out a comprehensive
scheme of entitlement to benefits or penalties for non-compliance with
statutory or administrative directives, it is both illogical and impractical
to classify the statute in monolith form as either conferring a benefit or
inflicting a penalty. Where the interest governed by the legislation is
substantial, and the government action proposed would inflict more than
de minimis harm, the judiciary cannot continue counselling plaintiffs to
rely on the political process to vindicate their interests. Certain matters
cannot be left to the vagaries of the political process for resolution. While
some would suggest that it is of the essence of the democratic process that
the will of the majority control, it controls not because it necessarily is
always right but "because it is the will of the majority".274 This, as Fuller
notes, "is an impoverished conception of democracy"275 and it suggests a
reason for judicial intervention in the outcome of the political process
that defies rational defense such as inequality of educational opportunity.
But how do we devise a formula that provides a basis for more active
judicial involvement in ensuring equal educational opportunity?
Considerable assistance in this task may be derived from the dissenting
judgment of McIntyre, J. in Mackay v. The Queen,276 and in particular
his observation that:
The question which must be resolved in each case is whether such
inequality as may be created by legislation affecting a special class... is
arbitrary, capricious or unnecessary, or whether it is rationally based and
acceptable as a necessary variation from the general principle of universal
273. Scott, Excerpt from a Dinner Address at the Official Opening of The University of
Windsor Law Building, 1970, reproduced in Djwa & Macdonald, ed's, On ER. Scott 144
(1983).
274. Fuller, "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication" (1978). 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353 at 367.
275. Id
276. Mackay v. The Queen [1980] 2 S.C.R. 370.
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application of law to meet special conditions and to attain a necessary and
desirable social objective.
277
In his view, digressions from the principle of universal application of laws
should only be countenanced by the judiciary to the extent necessary in
the circumstances to attain the desired social objective. From this may be
constructed a flexible equal opportunity analytical model well suited to
the post-Charter era in general and the educational setting in particular.
Under the McIntyre formula, the issue to be determined in equal
protection litigation, it is suggested, is whether the inequality imposed by
legislation can be struck down as arbitrary, or upheld as rationally based
to meet special conditions or attain a desirable social objective.278 The
burden of proof rests with the state to demonstrate that it has adopted the
classification scheme that is the least restrictive of individual liberties.
The advantages of a well-educated citizenry in a democracy are well
recognized.279 As a fundamental service that bestows advantages on both
the individual and society, it is difficult to fathom any other basic
formulation for the distribution of educational resources other than the
principle of equal opportunity.280 Therefore, there must be a heavy
burden of proof placed on parties defending inequalities in educational
opportunity. In other words, the importance of the interest to the
individual will determine the standard of judicial review.
The individual's interest in education can be divided into three
components: the right of access, a right to a good quality or appropriate
education, and a right not to be deprived of his educational interests
without due process of law. By using an equal-access/equal-outcomes
model, the court's analysis of educational classifications can extend
beyond empirical issues of resource distribution. In such areas as tracking
and program allotment, the court could demand that educational
authorities demonstrate that their classification schemes are both rational
and the least restrictive.
Judicial review of educational policies need not be restrained by the
absence of empirical data on the effect of variables such as resource
277. Id, at 406.
278. Id, at 407-8.
279. See Story, Miscellaneous Writings 124 (1835).
280. The District Courts in Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District 337 F.
Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971) and Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (1972), stated
that the quality of educational opportunity offered to the individual child must be a function
of the wealth of the state as a whole rather than the wealth of the individual district. "The
inadequacies of the District of Columbia Public School System whether occasioned by
insufficient funding or administrative inefficiency, certainly cannot be permitted to bear more
heavily on the 'exceptional' or handicapped child than on the normal child" (Mills v. Board of
Education, 348 E Supp. 866 (1972) at 876).
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discrimination on student achievement. Proof of inequality in substantive
pedagogical practices can be seen either as the existence of the inequality
of service itself - because equal opportunity is recognized as the basic
guiding principle in the distribution of educational resources - or in
terms of lower opportunity for individuals adversely affected by the
practice under scrutiny. It should be noted that the nature of the harm to
be remedied will help to define the limits of judicial review.
An equality standard which requires relatively equal resource (both
monetary and human) distribution absent substantial justification would
establish a fairly broad scope of judicial review. Resource discrimination
is an objective issue easily demonstrated by a plaintiff. Furthermore, once
discrimination is established, there is generally no need to prove
additional injury and the degree of discrimination is irrelevant.28 Many
of the evidentiary difficulties cited by the majority in Rodriguez, and by
commentators like Yudof, are bypassed and the court must decide
whether the defense of inequalities offered by the state constitutes
"substantial justification".
The assertion that, absent some substantial justification, the state is
obligated to distribute its education dollars equally must ... find support
in legal or ethical theories about how a just government should behave in
a democratic society. Considerations of judicial manageability demand
it.2
The basis of equal protection principles is to protect the individual
from deprivation as a result of arbitrary government action. Principles of
judicial manageability in the review of broad areas such as public
education must be based on a number of different sources and
considerations, and the first, and most basic, principle for judicial review
of educational policies is the constitutional standard of equal opportunity.
However, it has been stated that judicial activity to promote equal access
to school resources cannot be a based on equality of educational
outcomes: "Otherwise, courts will be saddled with the two-fold task of
determining when resource inequality hinders or promotes achievement
equality and of devising distribution systems that will achieve the
goal.1283 Educational outcomes, however, must be considered in
appraising the level of educational opportunity afforded. For example,
the general objectives of college preparatory programs are all very
similar: a certain level of substantive knowledge is to be imparted and the
281. See: R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282; Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966).
282. Yudof supra, note 206 at 485.
283. Id, at 481.
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student must master basic literacy skills and the discipline to complete the
work on schedule. A radically disproportionate failure rate among
college-bound students in interdistrict comparisons, even assuming
relative equality in educational expenditures, should raise a justiceable
issue under the equal protection/equal benefit principle as indicative of
inequality of opportunity. Judicial review must be triggered by the
existence of inequality and not the nature of the policy area or the degree
of discrimination.
284
Finally, it is necessary to consider the effect of judicial pronounce-
ments on other educational objectives, such as community control of
schools. Community control of schools should only be accepted as a
limiting consideration on the scope of judicial review of educational
opportunity where the legislative scheme makes true local control a
reality for all school districts. 28 5 Otherwise, "local control" becomes an
escape hatch for legislative schemes guilty of resource discrimination. The
"local control" argument is often shrouded in "basic democratic
principles" arguments and injects an unnecessary tension between the
role of the judiciary and the role of community government structures.
Local control would remain possible under an equal opportunity
principle that eliminated unjustifiable resource discrimination. 286 If harm
in equal educational opportunity litigation is construed as the existence of
resource discrimination, judicial review would be triggered by inequality
in resource distribution or inequality in educational outcome. Extraneous
educational objectives, like community control of schools, would only
constitute a limiting factor on the scope of judicial review where they
were in keeping with the basic principle of equal educational opportunity
and did not result in undue advantages to certain school disticts.
Evidentiary issues, the need to determine the relationship between equal
opportunity and educational achievement, only arise when the harm
occasioned is defined as lost opportunity.
Judicial intervention into the educational process to regulate
educational outcomes also has been described as a "socialist" model for
educational reform. 287
The boldest assumptions of the socialist model, the ones most directly
affecting judicial intervention, are as follows: first, that our technology can
284. "That swimming pools may not be educationally essential does not justify a
discriminatory decision to make them available to some students and not to others" (id, at
485).
285. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973) at 130 per
Marshall J., dissenting.
286. Coons & Sugarman, supra, note 50.
287. Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom 62 (1970).
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identify precisely what factors affect schooling outcomes; second, that
there are experts who can and will perform this function; and third, that
society is obliged to heed the advice of these experts in formulating the
scope of constitutional rights.288
Educational outcomes have been incorporated into the present analytical
model to act solely as an indicium of inequality of opportunity. The
assertion that it is necessary to demonstrate a positive correlation between
factors which affect schooling outcome and underachievement (or non-
achievement) among disadvantaged students before the judiciary should
attempt to intervene is somewhat tautological.
Critics of the socialist model of reform argue that harm within an
educational malpractice or equal opportunity claim must be established
along traditional legal structures of reasoning. 289 In an equal opportunity
claim, it is said it must be demonstrated that factors such as physical
facilities, better qualified teachers, and increased monetary resources
affect a child's ability to learn; and because such a positive correlation
cannot be demonstrated, there can be no denial of equal opportunity. The
consequence, of course, of this line of reasoning is that the inequality, in
effect, is legalized. Such arguments seem to bypass common sense and
insulate inequality in the provision of services behind a thin shroud of
logic. As Marshall J. pointed out in Rodriguez:
In fact, if financing variations are so insignificant to educational quality, it
is difficult to understand why a number of our county's wealthiest school
districts, which have no legal obligation to argue in support of the
constitutionality of the Texas legislation, have nevertheless zealously
pursued its cause before this Court.290
In arguing that there is no correlation between expenditure and
educational quality, the state is conceding the irrelevance of its own
legislative scheme of resource allocation. The weight of the individual's
interest in an education, at the very least, should shift the burden of
proving that such disparities do not affect the quality of education
afforded to the state.29
1
However, if the harm suffered by individuals who allege inequality of
educational opportunity is defined as "lost opportunity", the standard of
judicial review available would be reduced significantly. Opportunity
would be defined as the level of expenditure, thus leaving educational
authorities to decide the type of programs or activities best suited to the
district in question. Focusing on the issue of the equality of expenditure,
288. Yudof, supra, note 206 at 422.
289. Id
290. San Antonio Independent SchoolDistrict v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) at 85.
291. Id, at 86.
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however, may divert attention from the need to monitor the equality of
the service provided.292 For the right to an appropriate education to be
properly protected through legal mechanisms, there must be some basis
on which the judiciary also can review the outcomes of the educational
programs to measure their effectiveness.
The McIntyre formula may be employed to redress inequality in the
level of services provided interdistrict. The state would be forced to
demonstrate that interdistrict inequalities in the level of service provided
was neither capricious nor arbitrary, but was rationally based to obtain a
desired social objective. Inequality in educational opportunity cannot be
considered a desirable social objective. Other valid social objectives, such
as increased local control of schools, must be achieved within the basic
constitutional principle of equal opportunity. Furthermore, the McIntyre
formula does not represent an increase of the political role of the judiciary
in constitutional litigation. Because judicial review is available only upon
demonstration of unequal access or unequal outcome, there is little basis
on which to fear judicial involvement in the daily decisions of the public
authorities. The role of the judiciary is to pronounce constitutional
standards, not fashion minute and detailed policies. 293
VII. Conclusion
In attempting to balance the interests of students and institutions in a
drive towards a more effective public educational system, a structure of
"rights", then, can be useful. The individual possesses a clear and
identifiable interest in receiving a good quality education. As a
government benefit, the provision of educational services should be
governed by basic principles of fundamental justice 294 and equal
protection.295
Principles of fundamental justice may be fashioned so as to protect the
individual's interest in an education in disciplinary or dismissal
proceedings. These principles should ensure that individuals will always
possess an appropriate remedy for the vindication of private rights. Once
292. "When faced with the imminent threat of integration southerners showed willingness to
take some steps toward equality.... In South Carolina, for instance, the Governor and the
legislature had authorized a new $75 million bond issue. Even under the gun, however, the
equalization moves were limited. The new buildings were often overcrowded from the
beginning and offered a limited range of courses taught by poorly trained teachers" (Orfield,
"Will Separate Be More Equal?" Integrated Education, Jan-Feb. 1976, at 3).
293. It should be noted that in over a decade of desegregation litigation, the Courts have never
attempted to define "integrated" or establish a minimum numerical quotient for a district
school board.
294. Gibson, supra, note 261.
295. Coons and Sugarman, supra, note 50.
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an interest is recognized as deserving of protection, the structure of
analysis employed should be modified to accommodate the exigencies of
the factual circumstances giving rise to the alleged deprivation.
A leading decision of the United States Supreme Court on the issue of
due process, Goss v. Lopez, established a flexible test to determine the
protection required in educational disciplinary proceedings. Essentially,
the Court required that the rudiments of due process protection - a right
to a hearing, notice of a hearing and the right to be heard - would be
required in most disciplinary procedures but that the actual timing and
content of the hearing and the right to be heard - would be required in
most disciplinary procedures but that the actual timing and content of the
hearing was to be determined by an appropriate accommodation of the
competing interests involved. Despite the practical utility of such a
flexible approach to fashioning the constitutional protections to be
accorded individuals in the educational setting, courts have shied away
from mandating the review of academic dismissals on the ground of lack
of expertise. The decision to confine judicial review to disciplinary
procedures excludes the possibility of redress in an area of educational
policy where arbitrary decision, perhaps, are the most numerous and the
value to the individual of the interest affected (promotion, the right to
continue in a programme or institution, etc.) is greatest.
The adoption of a theory of structural due process within the ambit of
principles of fundamental justice would eliminate in Canada the
perceived need both to distinguish disciplinary dismissals from academic
dismissals, and to isolate academic dismissals from judicial review for fear
of challenging the integrity of the judgement of educators. Such a theory
would call for individualized decision-making in controversial policy
areas that can be characterized as "at least partly frozen [in place] by
institutional constraints". The educational system represents a model
grounds for the implementation of a structural due process theory
because of the recognized weight of the individual's interest in an
education and the heavily bureaucratized structure of educational policy
decision-making. The standard of judicial review employed in due
process litigation would remain directly correlated to the weight of the
individual's interest threatened. Again, it must be noted that the issue
before the court in such litigation is the degree of natural justice required
in a particular decision-making process: the choice and structure of such
processes remain the responsibility of educational authorities.
Similarly, notwithstanding that equal protection doctrine traditionally
has been applied primarily against racial classification,296 it also has a role
296. Yudof, supra, note 206.
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to play in the educational setting. The basis of the doctrine, which
prohibits the distribution of government resources and services unequally
on the basis of an invidious classification, can clearly be extended to
encompass invidious classifications, other than race, which result in harm
or prejudice to classes of citizens. Within the educational context, equal
opportunity doctrine could serve as a legal mechanism to protect the
individual's interest in receiving educational services. An individual's
right to an education must be expanded beyond a mere right of access to
a seat in a classroom for a mandatory schooling period:
... it is not enough to see to it that education is not actively used as an
instrument to make easier the exploitation of one class by another. School
facilities must be secured of such amplitude and efficiency as will in fact,
and not simply in name, discount the effects of economic inequality, and
secure to all the wards of the nation equality of equipment for their future
careers.297
However, traditional equal protection doctrine focused on questions of
formal equality. Thus, to function as a protective mechanism within the
educational setting, equal opportunity analysis must be developed in a
bistructured manner so as to allow consideration of both issues of access
to educational services and the quality of services provided.
The formula for equal protection litigation suggested by McIntyre J. in
Mackay v. The Queen establishes a basic two-step process of judicial
analysis: Is there demonstrated inequality in the provision of services? If
so, is the inequality rationally based to further or attain a desirable social
objective? A definition of equality of educational opportunity that
encompasses both access and quality considerations would expand legal
protection of an individual's right to an education. The question of
whether the demonstrated inequality is rationally based and designed to
attain a desirable social objective must be approached from the basis that
the party defending the inequality must prove its rationality.
Increased judicial involvement to protect the individual's right to an
education on either of the above bases need not be viewed as the end of
decision-making autonomy for public school authorities. The only issues
before the court in educational litigation are the constitutional standards
applicable to various educational policies. The design and structure of
educational policies to achieve pedagogical objectives and their day-to-
day implementation would remain the responsibility of education
professionals.
The constitutionalization of an individual's right to an education has
emerged as both a moral and legal imperative. In the words of Justice
297. J. Dewey, supra, note 5 at 114.
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Story: "It is one of the wise dispensations of Providence that knowledge
should not only confer power, but should also confer happiness. '298 As
educators struggle to adapt to increased work loads and drastic cutbacks
in government funding, the profession ceases to generate the impetus to
ensure that every child's birthright to an appropriate education is
protected. Many educational harms - claims arising from alleged
inequality of educational opportunity - can only be classified as non-
traditional harms. Legal mechanisms designed to protect the individual's
interest in an education will, of necessity, be of non-traditional design.
Essentially, the basic issue to be resolved is the value of an appropriate
education to both the individual and the society at large.
Our destruction, should it come at all, will be... [fUrom the inattention
of the people to the concerns of their government ... Make them
intelligent, and they will be vigilant; give them the means of detecting the
wrong, and they will apply the remedy. 299
As society becomes more complex, an appropriate education becomes
increasingly fundamental - not in terms of assuring personal success, but
as a means of promoting personal survival with dignity. The role to be
played by the judiciary in ensuring educational opportunity will be
influenced by a number of factors: judicial precedent, demands for
consistency in constitutional theories, political conceptions as to the
proper role of the judiciary in sensitive policy issues. The scope of judicial
involvement must be determined by the fact that the educational rights of
generations of students are being infringed by a series of educational
policies from which these students have no effective avenue of redress.
The constitutional arguments presented attempt to address broader
concerns as to the proper justification for increased judicial intervention
into the educational process. Perhaps the best justification for increased
intervention is, simply, that "a mind is a terrible thing to waste".30
298. Story, supra, note 279 at 124.
299. John Swett, quoted in Cloud, The Story of California's Schools 20 (1946).
300. Advertising slogan of the United Negro College Fund Appeal Campaign.
